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CONTRACT AND INNOVATION:
THE LIMITED ROLE OF GENERALIST
COURTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF NOVEL
CONTRACTUAL FORMS
RONALD J. GILSON,* CHARLES F. SABELt & ROBERT E. ScoTT
In developing a contractual response to changes in the economic environment, par-
ties choose the method by which their innovation will be adapted to the particulars
of their context. These choices are driven centrally by the thickness of the relevant
market-the number of actors who see themselves as facing similar circum-
stances-and the uncertainty related to that market. In turn, the parties' choice of
method will shape how generalist courts can best support the parties' innovation
and the novel regimes they envision. In this Article, we argue that contractual inno-
vation does not come to courts incrementally, but instead reaches courts later in the
innovation's evolution and more fully developed than the standard picture contem-
plates. Highly stylized, the trajectory of innovation in contract we find is this:
Private actors respond to exogenous shocks in their economic environments by
changing existing structures or procedures to make them efficient under the new
circumstances. The innovating parties stabilize their newly emergent practices
through a variety of regimes-both bilateral and multilateral-with the goal of
establishing the context through which the innovation is implemented. It is only at
this point, and when a dispute is presented to them, that courts step in. If contract
innovation does indeed reach generalist courts through the mediating institution of
these contextualizing regimes, then our argument follows directly: Because a central
goal of contract adjudication is to enforce the agreement in the context the parties
intended, the courts' willingness to defer to the context provided by the parties will
put the law more directly in the service of innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Contract is broadly regarded as a cohesive body of law precise
enough to facilitate transactions across very different domains, yet
open and flexible enough to accommodate and eventually discipline
substantial variations and changes in commercial practice without sac-
rificing its cohesion. There is disagreement as to whether contract
achieves these ends best when judges most fully respect the autonomy
of the parties and decide disputes principally by reference to the
formal agreements that the parties enter, or when judges are instead
free to go beyond the terms of the contract and inquire into the con-
text of the parties' dealings, and decide disputes with reference to the
parties' practices and informal understandings.' But there is little
I Beginning with the battle between the titans of contract-Samuel Williston and
Arthur Corbin-and continuing to the present, two polar positions have competed for
dominance in the interpretation of formal agreements between sophisticated parties. The
primary battleground has taken place in generalist courts that are committed to polar
interpretive styles: In a textualist regime, and absent ambiguity, generalist courts cannot
choose to consider context; in a contextualist regime, these courts must consider it.
Textualist interpretation-as embodied in the parol evidence and plain meaning rules and
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disagreement that contract law, as developed by generalist judges,
approximates the ideal image of the common law as a highly decen-
tralized and sensitive institution for responding incrementally to incip-
ient changes in the parties' relations. Thus, common law courts are
generally believed to be fully capable of extending the reach of
existing legal principles to emergent forms of agreement without
undermining the security of actors who continue to rely on traditional
doctrine.
In our view, this familiar picture mischaracterizes the ways in
which generalist courts do, and do not, effectively support innovation
in contract law. The goal of this Article is to replace this common but
erroneous picture with a more accurate one. We argue first and most
fundamentally that contractual innovation does not come to courts
incrementally-as where innovation is shaped gradually through itera-
tive exchanges between contracting parties and the courts-but
instead reaches the courts later in the innovation's evolution and more
fully developed than the standard picture contemplates. Highly styl-
ized, the trajectory of innovation in contract we find is this: Private
actors respond to exogenous shocks in their economic environments
by changing existing structures or procedures to make them efficient
under the new circumstances. The innovating parties stabilize their
newly emergent practices through a variety of regimes, both bilateral
and multilateral, with the goal of establishing the context through
which the innovation is implemented. It is only at this point, and when
a dispute is presented to them, that courts step in.
in the effect of an integration clause-looks to a contract's formal language and disregards
claims, unless anchored in the text, that the parties intended to assign contract terms a
special meaning that is revealed by the course of dealings or some other feature of the
context of their relation, or that the parties otherwise intended to supplement the formal
contract by unwritten understandings and undertakings. Contextualist courts, on the other
hand, reject the notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguous-
contextfree-meaning at all. By the same logic, they favor a soft parol evidence rule. Thus,
the court may admit extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause
declaring the contract to be an integrated writing, or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding
the fact that the writing appears final and complete on its face. Robert E. Scott, Text
Versus Context: The Failure of the Unitary Law of Contract Interpretation, in THE
AMERICAN ILLNEsS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAw (F. H. Buckley ed., forthcoming May
2013) (manuscript at 6) (on file with the New York University Law Review). For a discus-
sion of the competing interpretive regimes, see Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract
Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1023, 1057-62 (2009);
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926,
957-63 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation]; Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,
568-91 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory].
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As we develop here, the nature of these "contextualizing
regimes," 2 and hence the courts' function and the allocation of
responsibility between courts and alternative interpretive institutions,
depends on two characteristics of the economic market in which the
innovating parties participate: the thickness or scale of that market, as
measured by the number of actors who understand themselves to be
transacting under similar circumstances,3 and the uncertainty associ-
ated with that market.4 Across the four principal regions of space
defined by these two dimensions-low and high levels both of scale
2 We extend to purely private contractual relationships the conception of "contextual-
izing regimes" that was first used to describe public-private collaborations in Charles F.
Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to
the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 MIcH. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2012).
3 The thickness or scale of the relevant market facing contracting parties is one of the
central variables that explains how contractual innovation evolves. A thick market is one in
which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or services by using the same or sim-
ilar contracting behaviors and strategies. Hence the contracting is multilateral. In this
respect, similarity should be understood as a continuum. As we will see, broadly similar
transactions may still have significant idiosyncrasies, which will influence how a multilat-
eral contextualizing regime addresses markets that are thick at a general level and thinner
with respect to particular transactions. See infra text accompanying notes 97-113 (dis-
cussing fast-track construction rules and the Delaware Court of Chancery). The polar
opposite-a thin market-exists when each contracting party must negotiate a bespoke
agreement with its counterparty. Here contracting is bilateral.
4 As is commonplace, we follow Frank Knight in distinguishing between risk (the like-
lihood of an event that can be estimated probabilistically) and uncertainty (the likelihood
of an event whose occurrence, or even whether it could happen at all, is unknown). See
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197-232 (1921). For a discussion of
Knight's concept of uncertainty, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott,
Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 433 & n.2 (2009). For a helpful discussion of how the incomplete
foresight associated with Knightian uncertainty is central to institutional (contractual)
design, see Rudolph Richter, Efficiency of Institutions: From the Perspective of New
Institutional Economics with Emphasis on Knightian Uncertainty 16-20 (July 13, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105604. Exogenous uncer-
tainty-say, technological change that overtakes current knowledge-can produce a feed-
back effect on the contracting process itself. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra, at 448-49. Thus,
in high-uncertainty environments, where future contingencies cannot be estimated and
parties must adapt collaboratively, the contracting process itself reflects continuous uncer-
tainty. Id. at 455-56. In that sense, uncertainty is endogenous to the contract. As with
market thickness and the similarity of transactions, see supra note 3, risk and uncertainty
are also a continuum, where any particular transaction will present elements of both risk
and uncertainty but in different proportions. For expositional purposes, we will treat the
term "low-uncertainty" as covering situations in which probabilistic assessments can be
made in important respects, and we will use the term "high-uncertainty" for circumstances
where probabilistic assessments are of little consequence. Thus, a high level of uncertainty
exists when exogenous events that may affect the parties' obligations to perform are
unknown or cannot be estimated probabilistically. Conditions of high uncertainty-
generally the product of an exogenous shock-can occur in either bilateral or multilateral
markets. Similarly, under conditions of low uncertainty, both bespoke and multilateral con-
tractors can identify relevant risks that may impede future performance, estimate their
occurrence probabilistically, and allocate those risks in the resulting agreement.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
173April 2013]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
and uncertainty-courts must follow the instructions of the con-
tracting parties as to how their contract is to be adapted to its partic-
ular context. In each case, the role of generalist courts-the
nonspecialized workhorses of formal dispute resolution-is more
restricted than in the standard account, as much of the interpretation
of context will already have been established by other institutions
including by the parties themselves. Thus, in responding to contract
innovation driven by changes in the contracting parties' business envi-
ronment, courts must practice the passive virtues: The parties, not the
courts, drive innovation. Nonetheless, a court's approach to an inno-
vative contract can support or undermine the innovation-the court
can be either a friction or a facilitator.
In practice, the respect for party autonomy that we urge is under
threat from two directions. First, courts can-through inertia or juris-
prudential conviction-apply what they take to be standard default
rules of the common law of contract in disregard of the parties'
explicit understanding to the contrary (often elaborated jointly with
trade associations and regulators).5 Second, contemporary courts can
reinterpret or disregard the parties' agreement in favor of the judges'
understanding of the context of their dealings. Common law courts
were traditionally reluctant to incorporate informal understandings
and practices in the course of resolving commercial disputes, relying
instead on the maxim that "the courts do not make a contract for the
parties." 6 However, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
presaged the triumph in many areas of contract law of a new activist
approach.7 The Code's incorporation doctrine is the standard bearer
for the activist judicial role in the development of new forms of agree-
ment; it explicitly commits the courts to aid in the continued expan-
sion of commercial practices so that the law can be developed "by the
5 See infra Part II.C.1. As an example of this tendency, from roughly the 1960s through
the end of the 1980s, courts, in concord with the insurance industry and its regulators,
protected consumer interests by extending the scope of reasonable expectations of cov-
erage, explicit language in the agreement notwithstanding. Courts also elaborated a strong
variant of contra proferentem, so that a court, encountering an ambiguity in an agreement,
would immediately decide for the policy holder, rather than undertaking usual efforts to
determine the parties' meaning. Later courts played an important role in undermining this
insurance law regime by reaffirming the general, orthodox understanding of contra profer-
entem as a last, not a first resort in the resolution of ambiguity, and the priority of text over
expectations. For discussion, see Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 109-11 (2007) (describing trends in judicial treatment of contracts).6 See, e.g., Agnew v. Lacey Co-Ply, 654 P.2d 712, 715 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) ("A court
may not create a contract for the parties which they did not make themselves.").
7 The Second Restatement of Contracts has adopted the activist incorporation
approach first advanced by the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1979) (Supplying an Omitted Essential Term); id. § 221
(Usage Supplementing an Agreement); id. § 222 (Usages of Trade).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
174 [Vol. 88:170
CONTRACT AND INNOVATION
courts in the light of . . . new circumstances and practices.", This
commitment to the incorporation of inchoate contractual understand-
ings through the agency of generalist courts is deeply embedded in
contemporary contract law and forms the foundation for the standard
account of the role of courts in the development of contract.
Our argument, in contrast, is that sophisticated parties better
understand the subtleties of their context and better grasp the implica-
tions of the applicability vel non of the standard rules of contract law
to the support of their dealings than do even the most acute generalist
courts.9 Courts facilitate innovation in contract most directly by rec-
ognizing these limits and giving effect to the regimes that the parties
have created to take account of their context and its interaction with
the law of contract.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I frames the taxonomy of
contract innovation: the multi-dimensional space on which we build
our account of the relationship between generalist courts, contextual-
izing regimes, and contract innovation. Part II develops the general
argument of the relation between contractual innovation and contex-
tualizing regimes with regard to bilateral contracts and the role of
uncertainty. We stress two exemplars: first, the emergence of collabo-
rative contracting in global supply chains, platform production, and
project development that has figured prominently in recent years, and
second, the use of preliminary agreements as a means to investigate
whether to pursue a business opportunity with a partner. Part III dis-
cusses multilateral contextualizing regimes involving institu-
tions beyond the particular contracting parties, ranging from trade
8 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(2) cmt. 1 (2011). The Code explicitly invites courts to incorporate
incipient commercial context into novel forms of agreement through its definitions of
"agreement" and "contract." Agreement is defined as the "bargain of the parties in fact,
as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of
performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade . . . ." Id. § 1-201(3). Contract, in turn, is
defined as "the total legal obligation that results from the parties' agreement ..... Id.
§ 1-201(12).
9 In this Article, we examine the role of generalist courts in the emergence of innova-
tions in commercial contracting between sophisticated parties. We argue elsewhere that
any theory of optimal contract design and interpretation requires a separation of the ques-
tion of consumer protection-whether a particular contract is exploitive and, in turn, what
terms would be reasonable-from the design and interpretation of commercial contracts.
Consumer protection is an important goal of public policy, but placing the responsibility
for advancing this goal in the hands of generalist courts charged with the task of contract
enforcement and interpretation of commercial contracts is a category error. See Ronald J.
Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: An Integrated Theory of
Contractual Interpretation 48-58 (Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the New York University Law Review) (arguing that courts should not uniformly apply
standard common law rules of interpretation designed for commercial parties to consumer
contracts and exploring alternative approaches).
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associations in the cotton industry to the Delaware Court of Chancery
in complex corporate disputes. We situate these regimes by mapping
them against the combination of the two central characteristics of the
environment in which each arises: the level of uncertainty concerning
the activities that are covered, and the thickness of the market for
those activities-whether there are many or few participants facing
similar circumstances.
We conclude by summarizing the relation between the character
of the contextualizing regime and the uncertainty and scale associated
with the relevant market. In the end, the message is straightforward:
To facilitate innovation, courts must pay increased attention to the
role the contracting parties have given them through the formation of
contextualizing regimes. That role will only infrequently reflect the
traditional assumption that courts appropriately respond to innova-
tion by extending the reach of existing contract doctrine to emergent
forms of agreement. Nonetheless, even in respecting these limits,generalist courts will retain an important, albeit less central, role than
that accorded by the standard account. Common law contract doctrine
and generalist courts are still needed to deter opportunistic efforts by
contracting parties to exploit their counterparties. In this way, gener-
alist courts will retain their historic role in policing efforts to game the
system.
I
THE TAXONOMY OF CONTRACT INNOVATION AND THE
ROLE OF GENERALIST COURTS
In developing a contractual response to changes in the economic
environment, parties will choose the mechanism by which their inno-
vation will be best adapted to the particulars of their context. These
choices are driven centrally by the thickness of the relevant market
and the uncertainty related to that market. In turn, the parties' choice
of method will shape how generalist courts can best support the par-
ties' innovation and the contextualizing regimes they envision. In Part
L.A we frame the taxonomy of innovation in terms of the four regions
created by the intersection of high and low uncertainty and thin and
thick markets. Part I.B then addresses how that analysis informs the
role of generalist courts in interpreting the resulting contextualizing
regimes.
A. The Taxonomy of Contract Innovation
When markets are thick-in the sense that many actors face sim-
ilar changes in their dealings and stand to benefit from concerted
responses to them-the affected parties often will institutionalize their
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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innovative contract forms and terms through collective action. Put dif-
ferently, there are economies of scale in contracting. Depending on
the precise character of the collective action problems parties face, the
resulting structure for adapting their contracts to the particulars of the
context-what we will call a multilateral contextualizing regime-may
be entirely private (with contract terms developed by industry associa-
tions and disputes resolved by private arbitration), largely public (with
terms developed by an administrative agency in consultation with
trade associations and disputes resolved by an administrative tri-
bunal), or a combination of these (where courts enforce the collec-
tively determined contract forms). The nature of the regime,
moreover, will vary according to the level of uncertainty'o faced by
the actors. When uncertainty is low (where insiders to the activity
know what to do but judges are ignorant of the relevant details and
likely to remain so), attention will be focused on elaborating special-
ized terms and industry codes. When uncertainty is high (where
neither insiders nor outsiders can reliably predict on their own what
should be done), attention will focus on the creation of a joint frame-
work for exploring and defining new opportunities and mitigating
hazards in their realization.
When markets are thin and the actors few and scattered, parties
facing similar problems cannot rely on collective action to institution-
alize contractual innovation because the necessary scale is not present.
In these circumstances, innovation occurs initially in bilateral relation-
ships. Here, too, the level of uncertainty will determine how the par-
ties respond to changes in the business environment. When
uncertainty is low, parties in bilateral relationships can turn to
bespoke contracting, relying on contract design itself as the means of
integrating the relevant context into a novel formal agreement. But
where uncertainty is high, even sophisticated parties cannot respond
adequately to exogenous shocks by simply relying on forms of state-
contingent contracting. Rather, in the process of collaboration, the
parties develop governance mechanisms based on rich and regular
exchange of information on a project's progress that allows each to
ascertain the other's capacity to jointly proceed to define and produce
a product. This same exchange of information creates enough mutual
transparency so that opportunism can generally be detected before it
has ruinous consequences for the more vulnerable party. These collab-
orative arrangements-commonly found in supply chains, joint efforts
to develop new technologies, and preliminary agreements-differ
from traditional contracts in that they typically obligate the parties to
10 See supra note 4 (discussing uncertainty).
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jointly explore possibilities without committing them to execute
any specific project." Nevertheless, the purpose of these bilateral
contextualizing regimes-as of the institutionalized multilateral
regimes that come with scale-is to harmonize contractual relation
and context. This process of contracting for innovation is a govern-
ance framework designed to create a context in which the parties can
ascertain whether extended collaboration is possible and desirable.
In sum, the level of uncertainty will identify the vehicles for con-
tractual innovation that respond to substantive change in the business
environment. Depending on the thickness of the market, the parties'
contractual responses to these changes may take the form of bilateral
agreements between the participating firms; complex, multilateral
efforts through industry groups; or public-private "regulatory"
structures.
B. Implications for the Role of Generalist Courts
It is only when such contextualizing responses take form (or are
well on the way to formation) that generalist common law courts sys-
tematically begin to encounter significant innovations in contract.
Prior to that point, disputes that lead to litigation are unlikely. The
choice then posed for the generalist judge who first confronts the con-
tractual innovation is not merely (as the standard picture suggests)
how to weave a partial and incipient innovation into the fabric of con-
tract doctrine. Rather, the fundamental choice is (1) whether to accept
the output of the innovative contractual or institutionalized structure
even when it deviates (for reasons particular to the context) from out-
comes the court would reach in applying its normal rules of contract
enforcement and interpretation, and (2) when the court does gener-
ally defer to the judgments and instructions that emerge from the
innovative contractual structure, whether and when to superintend its
operation so that parties do not exploit their counterparties.
If contract innovation does indeed reach generalist courts
through the mediating institution of the contextualizing regime, then
our argument follows directly: The role of the generalist court is more
limited, and different, from the one commonly depicted. And the
court's role is more limited because, as innovations accumulate and
contextualizing regimes multiply, the proportion of cases properly
decided under the general rules of contract declines in relation to the
proportion resolved in accord with the principles and rules of the
various regimes. The court's role is also different because the problem
11 See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing collaborative
arrangements).
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of how best to manage relations in contextualizing regimes requires
courts to determine when to defer to the regimes, and when superin-
tending correction-policing opportunism-is necessary. That the role
of the generalist judge is more limited and different from that
normally portrayed does not make judges and courts unimportant to
the development of contract law. Contextualizing regimes are vulner-
able to disruption in many ways, and a proper balance between judi-
cial deference to such a regime's independence and judicial
intervention to protect the integrity of its operation is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for its survival.12
II
THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY: BILATERAL
CONTRACTING AS INNOVATION
IN CONTRACT DESIGN
In this Part we address uncertainty-one of the two central fea-
tures of our account of the determinants of innovation in contract. We
develop this theme in the context of bilateral relationships where
changes in the level of uncertainty can stimulate dramatic changes in
contract design. Thus, for example, a dramatic increase in the uncer-
tainty associated with product design has required radical innovations
in the contract forms-to support businesses' efforts to operate under
the now prevailing conditions. We argue that this innovation in con-
tract design is stimulated by three factors that operate along different
dimensions but are highly interactive. Exogenous shocks produce dra-
matic changes in the structure of efficient business arrangements,
whether because of changes in the firm, its industry's economic envi-
ronment, or the relevant regulatory environment. In turn, the change
in efficient business arrangements evoked by the shock induces inno-
vation in the contractual forms that institutionalize the new business
arrangements. These new contractual arrangements are highly sensi-
tive to the regulatory power of the state. That power is exercised
through the adjudicatory process. In other words, generalist courts
have to get the scope of enforcement right, respecting the autonomy
of these bilateral contextualizing regimes while at the same time inter-
vening to protect their integrity. This interactive process is neither
simple nor monotonic, and in each instance the nature and extent of
the innovation is a product of differing levels of uncertainty. Part II.A
12 An important question, one that we reserve for future work, is how generalist courts
can appropriately determine when to intervene so as to deter opportunism and when to
defer to the contextualizing regime created by the parties themselves. A failure to make
the right decision can undermine the emerging regime. See infra note 54 (discussing
various forms of judicial error in interpreting innovative contracts).
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introduces the pattern by which bilateral innovation-substantive and
contractual-evolves in both low- and high-uncertainty environments.
Part II.B then illustrates the high-uncertainty pattern through two
examples of contract innovation: collaborative agreements and
preliminary agreements. Part II.C addresses how these contract inno-
vations have fared in generalist courts.
A. The Evolution of Innovation in Contracting
In previous work, we identified what is loosely called "the infor-
mation revolution" as the exogenous shock that marked the emer-
gence of collaborative contracting in global supply chains, platform
production, and project development.13 During this period, innova-
tions cascaded, often leading to improvement cycles that became self-
perpetuating, devaluing or disrupting existing-and apparently
robust-solutions as these innovations progressed.14 The resulting
high levels of uncertainty rendered prior contracting forms obsolete.
Existing transactional structures, including contingent contracting
through modular exchange, relational contracting, and vertical inte-
gration, offered no solution to the contracting problem the parties
confronted: how to share capabilities in devising a product that no
single party could define on its own.' 5 Rather, in diverse settings-
including contract manufacturing of advanced electronics, contracts
between suppliers of sophisticated components and their manufac-
turers, and collaborations between biotech firms with innovative tech-
nologies and large pharmaceutical companies with expertise in the
regulatory and commercial complexities of bringing new drugs to
market-these changes led to an increase in interfirm relations in
which both parties with necessary skills expected to innovate jointly.16
13 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 441-42.
14 This increasing unpredictability manifests as the pervasive fear of what Clayton
Christensen calls "disruptive" technologies. Id. at 442; see CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN,
THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL
xviii-xix (1997).
15 See Susan Helper, John Paul MacDuffie & Charles Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations:
Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 443,
443-47 (2000) (arguing that firms have increasingly adopted a model of "pragmatic collab-
orations" to address these challenges); Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in
Routines, in THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: RECONSTRUCTING TRUST IN
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 106, 108 (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006)
("Network organizations manifestly outperform hierarchies in volatile environments.").
16 For a discussion of the rise of collaborative contracting in these diverse industries,
see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 438-44. The development of the Boeing 787
aircraft is a good example of the demand for collaboration. Innovation in the design and
manufacture of the wing, the province of one supplier (or group of suppliers), is dependent
on the design and manufacture of the fuselage, the province of a different supplier (or
group of suppliers), and vice versa. Innovation in one structure must mesh with innovation
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In precisely that setting, when standard theory predicts vertical
integration as the response to combining different capabilities in the
face of uncertainty,17 parties chose contract-not common owner-
ship-as the structure of their collaboration.' 8
Note that initial uncertainty does not inevitably lead to this out-
come. In some of these settings the parties anticipate that joint explo-
ration, if successful, will resolve the uncertainty at the outset of their
dealings and give rise to familiar contractual problems.19 In the case of
the pharmaceutical collaborations, for example, as uncertainty is
reduced, reliance on the contextualizing regime gives way to reliance
on more familiar instruments, either traditional statements of obliga-
tion and remedy with a mix of rules and standards20 or, when the
in the other in order for either to be successful. The wing must not only be compatible with
the fuselage; the two must fit. "Innovation is thus a collaborative and iterative process
rather than a discrete product supplied by a party upstream in the supply chain according
to specifications set by a downstream customer." Id. at 450. As difficulties in managing the
complex 787 supply chain have shown, the problems associated with extreme uncertainty
are not easily solved even by innovation. See id.
17 See Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm
Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 629, 649-50 (2007) (noting that the hold-up
problem "clearly pose[s] problems for long-term contracting, and those problems are exac-
erbated in volatile environments," and that "when the problems that are associated with
transaction costs are important, [transaction costs] models suggest that firms will choose
governance structures-including vertical integration or separation-to reduce the likeli-
hood and cost of haggling and exploitation").
18 See, e.g., JoHN DEERE & Co. & STANADYNE CORP., LONG TERM AGREEMENT (Dec.
14, 2001) [hereinafter JOHN DEERE/STANADYNE AGREEMENT] (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (five-year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration sys-
tems, injection nozzles, and related products by Deere from Stanadyne); WARNER-
LAMBERT CO. & LIGAND PHARM. INC., RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND LICENSE
AGREEMENT (Sept. 1, 1999) [hereinafter WARNER-LAMBERT/LIGAND AGREEMENT], avail-
able at http://contracts.onecle.com/ligand/warner.rd.1999.09.01.shtml (pharmaceutical
research and development collaboration between "big pharma" and "little pharma");
PHARMACOPEIA, INC. & BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB Co., COLLABORATION AND LICENSE
AGREEMENT (Nov. 26, 1997) [hereinafter PHARMACOPEIA/BMS AGREEMENT], available at
http://contracts.onecle.com/accelrys/bristol-myers.collab.1997.11.26.shtml (same); APPLE
COMPUTER, INC. & SCI SYSTEMS, INC., FOUNTAIN MANUFACTURING AGREEMENT (May
31, 1996) [hereinafter APPLE/SCI SYSTEMs AGREEMENT], available at http://contracts.
onecle.com/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml (a contract manufacturing agreement for SCI
to produce designated products at the plant in Fountain, Colorado). For an in-depth anal-
ysis of these contractual responses to continuous uncertainty, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
supra note 4, at 458-71.
19 For an example of how a high-uncertainty collaborative agreement can evolve into a
low-uncertainty contingent contract, see PHARMACOPEIA/BMS AGREEMENT, supra note
18. For detailed discussion of this contract, see Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel &
Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory,
Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1405-10 (2010).
20 See, e.g., WARNER-LAMBERT/LIGAND AGREEMENT, supra note 18, art. 4.2 (granting
Warner-Lambert an option to proceed to develop or market product subject to its obliga-
tion to "use diligent efforts to pursue" commercialization); Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra
note 4, at 467-71 (discussing WARNER-LAMBERT/LIGAND AGREEMENT). Commercial con-
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reduction in uncertainty is substantial, the creation of property rights
through the use of nested options.21
In other settings, furthermore, repetition results in a learning pro-
cess that reduces uncertainty, permitting a shift from a contextualizing
regime to a contingent contract: Accrued experience substitutes for
collaborative exploration so that it is possible to identify the relevant
contingencies going forward. Here, contracts become more complex
and complete as time goes on.2 2 When either successful exploration or
tracts often include both precise rules and general standards, and courts will then actively
interpret and enforce such standards by reference to context evidence. For example, con-
tracts may state one party's performance obligation as making "commercially reasonable
efforts," "reasonable efforts," or "reasonable best efforts." Robert E. Scott & George G.
Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 835 (2006). Parties
choose their mix of rules and standards so as to optimize the admissibility of context
evidence over two dimensions: when the court will look to context and who decides what
context matters. The combination of general and specific terms, therefore, offers parties
the ability to braid the text with context evidence that is revealed over the course of con-
tract performance. Scott, supra note 1 (manuscript at 20); Scott & Triantis, supra, at
842-43.
21 See, e.g., PHARMACOPEIA/BMS AGREEMENT, supra note 18, art. 2.1.3 (granting
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) an option to develop, subject to Pharmacopeia's right to ter-
minate if BMS discontinues development); Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at
1408-10 (discussing the role of nested options in contracts). In the case of these pharma-
ceutical collaborations, as uncertainty is reduced the separation of formal process terms
from informal substantive terms gives way to formal contracting over substance: Once the
product is identified, collaboration is replaced by an allocation to the pharmaceutical com-
pany of the responsibility to use commercially reasonable efforts to bring the drug to
market. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 470-71. There is additional complexity in
the case of large pharmaceutical company/biotech collaborations. One problem is that the
biotech firm, which typically has a number of research projects with other companies as
well as proprietary research, may use the contractual payments to cross-subsidize other
projects to the disadvantage of the pharmaceutical company and its project. Another is
that the biotech company may skew research to its benefit and to the detriment of the
commercially oriented research desired by the pharmaceutical. Here the problem is not
uncertainty per se-both parties know and understand the object of the contract and the
desired inputs to performance, and the pharmaceutical company will know when the
biotech is, from the commercial point of view, misdirecting the project. Rather, the
problem is that the pharmaceutical company will not be able to prove the misbehavior to
the court at a reasonable cost. But because uncertainty is low, the parties can still use
innovative contingent contracting to police the biotech company by granting the pharma-
ceutical company an unconditional option to terminate the relationship, and thereby
secure broad property rights to the research output on payment of a termination fee. The
termination fee, in turn, constrains responsive opportunism by the pharmaceutical com-
pany. This use of options may viably substitute for the ex ante incorporation of perform-
ance specifications in a low-uncertainty environment because the inputs that may be
subject to opportunism are fully observable by the contracting parties. Josh Lerner &
Ulrike Malmendier, Contractibility and the Design of Research Agreements, 100 AM. ECON.
REv. 214, 215 (2010) ("[T]he payments associated with termination prevent the financing
firm from exercising the termination option opportunistically.").
22 See Nicholas S. Argyres, Janet Bercovitz & Kyle J. Mayer, Complementarity and
Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An Empirical Study of IT Services Contracts, 18 ORG.
Sci. 3, 15 (2007) ("[C]ontractual partners ... that had a longer history of transacting with
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repetition results in a reduction in uncertainty, the parties are able to
write contracts that provide relatively explicit instructions to courts
indicating what context to consider and what context to ignore. 23 The
parties are, thus, less reliant on informal mechanisms created by the
contextualizing regime and can instead turn to a variety of contract
clauses to deal with what is now the kind of low-uncertainty environ-
ment in which the enforcement role of the court figures most
prominently. 24
When uncertainty is reduced in either of these ways, current law,
despite the ongoing battle over interpretive styles,25 faces familiar and
tractable problems. It is in this thin-market, low-uncertainty environ-
ment that we observe the state-contingent contract-the discrete con-
tract in legal terminology 26-that is the canonical case for parties
contracting under stable conditions. Because parties can anticipate the
environment in which performance will occur, the contract itself will
reflect it. Even if bespoke contracting can seldom be completely pre-
scient, where uncertainty is low the parties can specify in the formal
contract the relevant context within which specific performance obli-
each other were more likely to include contingency planning in their contracts."); Kyle J.
Mayer & Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer
Industry, 15 ORG. Sci. 394, 396 (2004) (finding that successive contracts between the same
two contracting partners become more complex over time as the partners learn how to
address contracting hazards); Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, Do Prior Alliances
Influence Alliance Contract Structure?, in STRATEGIC ALLIANCEs: GOVERNANCE AND
CONTRACTS 206, 206-07 (Africa Ariflo & Jeffrey J. Reuer eds., 2006) (finding that con-
tracts are more complete or detailed when firms have prior alliances, whether with the
same firm or other firms).
23 For examples of contractual language providing contextual instruction, see infra
notes 27-29 and accompanying text. There are good reasons to believe that commercially
sophisticated parties prefer a regime that follows the parties' instructions specifying when
to strictly enforce formal contract terms and when to delegate authority to a court to con-
sider surrounding context evidence. By eliminating the risk that courts will erroneously
infer the parties' preference for contextual interpretation, such a regime reduces the costs
of contract enforcement and enhances the parties' control over the content of their con-
tract. That control, in turn, permits sophisticated commercial parties to implement the
most efficient design strategies available to them. Ex post, preferences may change for the
party disfavored by the resolution of uncertainty, who may then prefer the right to per-
suade a court of a different result. Of course, that is the point of the ex ante focus. Kraus &
Scott, supra note 1, at 1028; Scott, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3).
24 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 20, at 851-56 (discussing acceleration and termina-
tion rights, best efforts obligations, force majeure, and liquidated damages clauses as exam-
ples of contract terms in low-uncertainty environments that delegate to courts the task of
applying general standards as constrained by precise rules).
25 See supra note 1 (discussing tension between textualist and contextualist methods for
interpreting formal agreements between sophisticated parties).
26 The categorization in contract law scholarship of discrete versus relational contract is
generally attributable to the work of Ian Macneil. See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of
Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 693-96 (1974) (describing the distinction between dis-
crete and relational contracts).
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gations are measured. Innovation in these relatively complete con-
tracts thus takes the form of discursive exposition of goals,
expectations, and business plans, whether in the contract's preamble
or in particular sections. Contract clauses that embed context in the
written agreement include "whereas" or "purpose" clauses that
describe the parties' business plan and the transaction, 27 definition
clauses that ascribe particular meanings to words and terms that may
vary from their plain meaning,28 and appendices that provide more
precise specifications governing performance as well as any memo-
randa the parties want an interpreting court to consider in interpreting
the contract's text.29 This additional context can supplement precise
specifications of outcomes while still constraining a future court's dis-
cretion to range more widely than the parties want ex ante.30
But there is a substantial and apparently growing range of situa-
tions in which uncertainty is persistent or recurrent-that is, uncer-
tainty starts high and remains so. Researchers have found parties
trying to cope with high levels of uncertainty in a variety of diverse
settings and industries: for example, in the co-development of succes-
sive generations of innovative components by automobile, construc-
tion, or agricultural equipment manufacturers and their leading
suppliers; in the regular, joint redefinition of "service levels" by the
providers of business process outsourcing (typically "back office" ser-
vices ranging from human resources management to account or trea-
sury management); and in successive collaborations between large
27 See, e.g., APPLE/SCI SYSTEMS AGREEMENT, supra note 18, at 1 ("The parties desire
that Apple engage SCI to assemble, test and package certain Products, Service Units and
Spare Parts, as defined below, on a turnkey basis at Fountain on the terms and conditions
of this Agreement.").
28 See, e.g., ALLSTATE INS. Co. & AcxioM CORP., DATA MANAGEMENT OUTSOURCING
AGREEMENT art. 2 (Mar. 19, 1999) [hereinafter ALLSTATE/AcxioM AGREEMENT], avail-
able at http://contracts.onecle.com/acxiom/allstate.outsource.1999.03.19.shtml (defining
thirty-four technical or nonstandard meanings including specialized meanings of
"Affiliate," "Agreement," "Confidential Information," "Current Projects," "Data
Integrity," "End-User," "Material Default," "Party," "Person," "Problem," "Term,"
"Work Order," and "Work Product").
29 See, e.g., id. at xi (listing appended schedules which set out services, key personnel,
reports, and other contract details).
30 See Scott & Triantis, supra note 20, at 848-56 (discussing parties' inclusion of both
precise terms and general standards to determine the boundaries of judicial discretion).
There is empirical evidence that most commercial parties prefer the freedom to choose
how and when to delegate discretion to courts to interpret commercial contracts. See
Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOzo L.
REv. 1475, 1478 (2010) ("New York's formalistic rules win out over California's contextu-
alist approach. As predicted by theory, sophisticated parties prefer formalistic rules of con-
tract law.").
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pharmaceutical firms and different biotech companies.3 ' The
challenge facing transactional lawyers in these circumstances is to
craft a contractual structure-what we are calling a contextualizing
regime-that supports ongoing collaboration, allows adjustment of
the parties' obligations under conditions of continuing uncertainty,
and limits the risk of opportunism inherent in open-ended goals.
Unaddressed, such risk undermines the incentive to make efficient
relation-specific investments in the first place. Absent a successful
design for innovative contractual safeguards, the substantive innova-
tion fails.32
B. Innovation in Bilateral Contractual Design
1. The Case of Collaborative Agreements
The common challenges facing parties contracting across organi-
zational boundaries when uncertainty makes specification of the
product impossible yield solutions with common elements: A process
of collaboration substitutes functionally for ex ante specification of
the desired product-the process defines the specification, not the
other way around. 33 Through this process each party makes relation-
specific investments in learning about the other's capabilities. These
31 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 472-94 (describing how parties use collab-
orative contracting to cope with uncertainty); see also Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield,
Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation
7-10 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law & Econ. Research Paper, No. C12-3, 2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1984915 (finding empirical support for the
institutional structure of collaborative contracting in a study of governance structures
conducted through interviews with a group of innovative firms). For a list of specific con-
tracts discussed in Contracting for Innovation, see supra note 18.
32 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 472 (discussing elements that comprise
the contracting problem for firms engaged in collaborative innovation).
33 In an earlier article, we described the character of the contracting problem facing
parties in the rapidly innovating industries that we investigated. Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
supra note 4, at 433-36. The key variable is the substantial increase in uncertainty occa-
sioned by the rapid pace of technology such that no firm is capable of producing state of
the art technology by itself. See id. at 449 (describing how, in high-uncertainty environ-
ments, collaborative contracting substitutes for the more traditional risk-allocation provi-
sions of conventional contracts). This has led to collaborative agreements in which parties,
by sharing private information across organizational boundaries, have combined know-
how and specialization to produce a product. Innovation is thus "the product of a joint
effort by two or more organizations; it is metaphorically situated between them and is
dependent on both." Id. at 450. Tracy Lewis and Alan Schwartz model a simpler version of
high-uncertainty contracting arrangements. They address innovation that contemplates
alternative phases of effort, first by one party and then by the other, rather than the
ongoing simultaneous involvement of both parties, as has been observed in high-
uncertainty contexts. See Tracy Lewis & Alan Schwartz, Long Term Contracting with
Private Information 4-5 (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 446, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2016375.
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investments raise the costs to each party of replacing its counterparty
with another-its switching costs-and so restrain both parties from
taking advantage of their mutual dependency.34
The key design innovation in these collaborations is to use a
formal contract to create a governance structure that is sufficiently
robust to support iterative joint effort.35 The goal is to jointly discover
the characteristics of the product the parties contemplate making. The
formal contract creates a bilateral contextualizing regime designed to
regulate only the collaboration commitment itself, not the course or
the outcome of the collaboration.36 Consequently, legal enforcement
is limited to protecting each party's promised investment in the collab-
orative process rather than expanded to include, for example, a divi-
sion of the surplus from the commercialization of a product that might
34 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel, & Robert E. Scott, Contract, Uncertainty, and
Innovation, in RULES FOR GROWTH: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND GROWTH THROUGH
LEGAL REFORM 223, 228 (2011) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract, Uncertainty,
and Innovation]; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 449.
35 The following paragraphs in this Part draw on our previous work in Gilson, Sabel &
Scott, supra note 19, and Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract, Uncertainty, and Innovation,
supra note 34.
36 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 448-58 (discussing why and how
parties formalize their contracts in the face of uncertainty and information costs). For a
non-exhaustive and non-random sample of collaborative contracts that combine these ele-
ments see, for example, BOEING Co. & SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC., GENERAL TERMS
AGREEMENT (June 17, 2005) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (general
terms agreement covering purchase orders by Boeing for particular products to be supplied
by Spirit Aerosystems); NANOSYS, INC. & MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC WORKS, LTD.,
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (Nov. 18, 2002), available at http://contracts.onecle.com/nano
sys/matsushita.rd.2002.11.18.shtml (collaboration agreement to develop photovoltaic
devices with nano components in Asia); JOHN DEERE/STANADYNE AGREEMENT, supra
note 18 (five-year supply contract for the purchase of fuel filtration systems, injection noz-
zles, and related products by John Deere from Stanadyne); ALLSTATE/AcxIoM
AGREEMENT, supra note 28 (contract for Axciom to develop a data acquisition system to
support Allstate's underwriting of new business in auto and property insurance); AVSA
S.A.R.L. & NEW AIR CORP., AIRBUS A320 PURCHASE AGREEMENT (April 20, 1999),
available at http://contracts.onecle.com/jetblue/airbus.a320.1999.04.20.shtml (JetBlue and
Airbus purchasing agreement); APPLE/SCI SYSTEMs AGREEMENT, supra note 18 (contract
manufacturing agreement for SCI to produce designated products for Apple on a turnkey
basis); PHARMACOPEIA/BMS AGREEMENT, supra note 18 (pharmaceutical research and
development collaboration between "big pharma" and "little pharma"); PHOENIX
TECHNOLOGIES LTD. & INTEL CORP., AGREEMENT (Dec. 18, 1995), available at http://
contracts.onecle.com/phoenix-tech/intel.supply.1995.12.18.shtml (supply contract for
Phoenix to be a principal supplier of system-level software to Intel); WARNER-LAMBERT/
LIGAND AGREEMENT, supra note 18 (pharmaceutical research and development collabora-
tion between "big pharma" and "little pharma"); AM. AXLE & MFG., INC. & GEN.
MOTORS CORP., COMPONENT SUPPLY AGREEMENT (Mar. 1, 1994) (on file with the New
York University Law Review) (requirements contract for motor vehicle components to be
supplied by AAM to GM). See also George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and
Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REV. 99, 103-05, 128-29 (2009) (citing examples of collaborative
contracts).
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result if the collaboration succeeds.37 Two closely linked components
determine the formal governance arrangement's success.
The first element is a formal commitment by both parties to the
ongoing mutual exchange of private information: This process will
determine if a project is feasible, and if so, how the parties' joint
objectives can be best implemented.38 The second element is a proce-
dure for resolving disputes that arise during the course of this collabo-
rative exchange. Under the conditions of continuous uncertainty
typical of the collaboration, the parties can anticipate encountering
unpredicted problems that require both cooperation and know-how to
solve and that can be expected to generate occasions of disagreement.
The key feature, therefore, is the "contract referee mechanism" that
requires the collaborators to solve these problems by reaching unani-
mous (or near unanimous) agreement on crucial decisions; persistent
disagreement among the group is resolved (or not) by unanimous
agreement at higher levels of management from each firm.39 These
two components together make observable, and avert misunderstand-
ings about, each party's character traits and substantive capabilities.
As a direct result of the processes specified in the formal contract,
each party thereby gains valuable knowledge of its counterparty's
capacities and problem-solving type. This contract-specific knowledge
creates the conditions for informal enforcement of the collaboration:
It builds trust and, in turn, creates the switching costs that constrain
future opportunistic behavior. Innovation thus occurs at both the sub-
stantive and contractual levels: The bilateral contextualizing regime
"braids" formal and informal contractual elements in novel ways that
respond to the technological innovation the contract is designed to
support.40
37 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Technologies, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 2d 668, 696-97
(S.D. Ind. 2006) (holding that the contractual remedy for breach of a collaborative agree-
ment is limited to the right to terminate and retain accrued scientific information).
38 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 476-79 (describing the iterative processes
of information exchange that comprise a fundamental aspect of specific contracts).
39 See id. at 479-81 (describing the role and effects of the contract referee mechanism).
Requiring unanimity for project decisions makes it easy for reasonable skeptics to require
more information from enthusiasts; the desire to avoid escalating disagreements up to
impatient superiors discourages obstinacy among subordinate collaborators. Gilson, Sabel
& Scott, supra note 19, at 1403; see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 480 n.126
("[Niot exercising the option to behave opportunistically by taking advantage of the una-
nimity rule is a credible signal of cooperation.").
40 In an earlier article, we described the concept of a braided contract as a response to
the endogenous uncertainty inherent in contracts for innovation that makes the perform-
ance obligations under the agreement difficult both for counterparties to observe and for
third parties to verify. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1386. The solution is for
parties to combine formal and informal elements by creating a formal governance structure
that specifies processes that render each party's actions under the agreement more
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The formal element of a braided contract is, thus, distinctively
bounded in its goals. It operates to allow the parties jointly to learn
about each other's skills and capacity for collaborative innovation,
and to develop jointly the routines required to collaborate in the ser-
vice of substantive innovation. This limited commitment anticipates a
significant constraint on the potential damages to which the formal
contract can give rise. Production and purchase commitments-the
substantive outputs of the collaboration-result only from the
informal contract that is supported by the increased switching costs
generated by the collaboration process itself.41 Thus, collaborative
contracting represents the braiding of two forms of contracts that the
academic literature treats as substitutes, while real contracting parties
treat them as complements. In effect, contractual braiding
endogenizes trust by formalizing the process that builds trust and sup-
ports informal contracting based on the trust created. 42 In this setting,
we see just the opposite of the behavioral literature's concern that
formal contracting will drive out informal contracting by inducing the
parties to make calculating decisions where they otherwise would
have been guided by norms of reciprocity. 43 Rather, the formal
transparent and thus observable to the counterparty. Enhancing the ability of each party to
observe the actions of the counterparty allows each one to learn about the other's capacity
to innovate successfully as well as their disposition to cooperate. See id. at 1402-03 (dis-
cussing how braiding works in the prototypical case). In turn, "continuing cooperation
builds trust . . . and . . . protects each party's reliance on that trust in its substantive per-
formance by increasing . . . the costs of finding an alternative partner capable of reliably
doing, and learning, as much as the current one." Id. at 1403. For an extended analysis of a
prototypical braided contract, see id. at 1405-10, where the author discusses the
Pharmacopeia/BMS Agreement.
41 Only where the subject of the braided contract is a discrete project do we see formal
contracting over the output of the process. In the discrete project setting, switching costs
discourage opportunism during the collaborative period, but the parties have to fear
opportunistic renegotiation once the cooperative stage of the project is completed and
switching costs no longer provide protection. The only issue then remaining is division of
the gains from prior cooperation. As a result, an explicit constraint on opportunism must
be employed, but at this stage, the uncertainty having been resolved, the contract theory
solution of allocating rights to decisionmaking is feasible. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract,
Uncertainty, and Innovation, supra note 34, at 230 n.15. For a specific contractual example,
see the WARNER-LAMBERT/LIGAND AGREEMENrr, supra note 18, arts. 4.2, 5.3.1-.2 (allo-
cating to "big pharma" the first option to develop, and upon their decision to abandon,
granting residual rights to "little pharma").
42 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1402-05.
43 For examples of the behavioral literature analyzing the crowding out problem, see
Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 131, 132 (2001) ("At interme-
diate levels [of enforcement], honesty is crowded out; more second movers breach, and
resources are wasted in trials."); Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A
Meta-analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on
Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 659 (1999) ("[R]eward contingencies under-
mine people's taking responsibility for motivating or regulating themselves."); Ernst Fehr
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
188 [Vol. 88:170
CONTRACT AND INNOVATION
contract creates the conditions that allow informal contracting to
function.
2. Supporting the Search for Partners: The Case of Preliminary
Agreements
Similar innovations are underway in certain types of preliminary
agreements. The increasing rate of technological change means that
parties functioning in an uncertain environment cannot depend on the
next generation of solutions emerging directly out of current practice.
Rather, solutions are likely to come from unexpected places, far
removed from the established development path.44 As a result, parties
must constantly search for unanticipated alternatives to current ways
of doing business. In this way, uncertainty and search are inextricably
linked: Under uncertainty, searching for partners who are capable and
willing to participate in an incompletely specified collaboration is
essential to doing business rather than merely a preliminary step
toward a possible future contract. In this sense, contracting for inno-
vation as canvassed in the previous section is just a special, albeit
extreme, case of the impact of the increased velocity of changes.
Thus, in domains as diverse as commercial contracting, corporate
acquisitions, and complex construction projects,4 5 parties increasingly
& Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation? 26 (Univ. of
S. Cal. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Paper No. C01-3, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=229047 ("This paper shows that reciprocity-driven volun-
tary cooperation may indeed be crowded out by incentive contracts." (emphasis added));
Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3, 15-16 (2000)
(arguing that "the introduction of the fine changes the perception of people regarding the
environment in which they operate," but does not necessarily reduce penalized behavior);
Daniel Houser et al., When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and
Non-cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 509, 522 (2008) ("Credible threats of sanc-
tions often failed to produce cooperative behavior, and our evidence is that incentives, not
intentions, underlie this effect.").
44 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 4, at 442 ("Precisely because their experience
teaches them how to improve on what they already know and how to provide what their
similarly focused customers believe they need, dominant producers do not see a threat
coming from an entirely different direction.").
45 In the construction industry, collaborative contracts calling for iterative information
exchange are commonly used to facilitate coordination during complex projects, and espe-
cially to target problems as they emerge in order to respond effectively to them. See, e.g.,
GEORGETOWN 19TH ST. DEv., LLC, & TURNER CONSTR. Co., AGREEMENT art. 5.2 (Apr.
1, 2003) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (providing that the construc-
tion manager's trade contractors shall meet at least once a week with the owner and the
architect to review the work and prepare a list of decisions or actions which the owner
must make or take in the next sixty days to avoid delays). For a detailed account of how
such mechanisms function in practice, see ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO:
How To GET THINGS RIGHT 54-71 (2009). Similar collaborative arrangements appear to
be proliferating in business process outsourcing. See, e.g., NEW CENTURY FIN. CORP. &
ACCENTURE LLP, PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
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realize that the feasibility of many projects can only be determined by
joint investment in the production of information to evaluate whether
a project is profitable to pursue. 46 These types of bilateral arrange-
ments typically take the form of preliminary agreements or letters of
intent, as they are termed in the context of corporate acquisitions.47
The common feature of these regimes is to facilitate joint explo-
ration and search without imposing legal consequences on the out-
come of the parties' collaborative activity. In the contextual
framework of this relationship, neither party can demand perform-
ance of the transaction that the parties hope will result if collaboration
is successful. If in the end the parties cannot agree on a final contract,
they may abandon the deal. In effect, by entering into a preliminary
agreement both parties obtain an option on (each future round of) the
deal: The price of the option is the cost of undertaking the preliminary
investment, and the option can be exercised once the parties learn the
information that their preliminary investments have produced.48
Agreements of this kind place demands on generalist courts to recog-
nize new forms of contracting that heretofore were denied legal
enforcement.
C. Collaborative Contracting and Preliminary Agreements
in Generalist Courts
1. Judicial Enforcement of Emergent Innovations
Contracting parties must be able to count on the state's enforce-
ment monopoly if they are confidently to rely on novel forms of
agreement. Ideally, generalist courts should respond to exogenously
induced innovations by enforcing the chosen methods of mutual
http://contracts.onecle.com/new-century-financiallaccenture-services-2006-01-25.shtml. The
agreement provides that Accenture will supply defined human resource services to New
Century and periodically improve them. Id. at Exhibit 7.4. Moreover, under the agreement
Accenture will conduct surveys of New Century employees to determine their level of
satisfaction with the services provided. Id. at Exhibit 7.6(a). If the results of those surveys
show that the level of satisfaction has dropped below the target level, Accenture will ana-
lyze the cause of the drop, develop an action plan to improve the level of satisfaction,
present the plan to New Century for comment and approval, and implement the approved
plan. Id. at Exhibit 7.6(c). This discussion is adapted from Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra
note 19, at 1423 n.156.
46 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1422-23.
47 For a discussion of the range of preliminary agreements, see RALPH B. LAKE & UGO
DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS (1989). For a
discussion of letters of intent-a preliminary agreement of sorts-in corporate acquisi-
tions, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1439-44.
48 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 665-66, 680-82 (2007) ("Preliminary agreements thus
commonly are exploratory; that is, the performance of a preliminary agreement sometimes
is a necessary condition for parties to pursue an efficient project later.").
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cooperation on terms consistent with the arrangements themselves. A
court's ability to achieve this consistency will depend very generally
on (1) its expertise in the domain of innovation, (2) the conspicuous-
ness of the contextualizing regime (that is, the salience of the industry
codes or other markers that indicate to outsiders that insiders have
given distinctive meaning and effect to usages they agree on by
creating a regime), and (3) the extent to which the court respects the
purposes and values to which the regime is dedicated.
As we will see in the case of the Delaware Court of Chancery,
courts that are expert in the innovators' domain can see contextual-
izing regimes through the participants' eyes and give effect to novel
forms of agreement.49 Conspicuously marked multilateral contextual-
izing regimes that arise in thick markets put courts on notice that par-
ticular kinds of expertise are in play and that generalist knowledge of
doctrine and the effects of its application in the usual run of cases may
be an insufficient or erroneous guide to decisionmaking. The more
clearly marked the regime, the more likely it is that the court will be
alerted to the possibility that doctrine may not be applicable as usual.
However, in the case of innovations that emerge from the bilateral
arrangements discussed in this section, the unique governance struc-
tures are less visible to a reviewing court.50 Moreover, unlike bespoke
contingent contracts between sophisticated parties, here the courts
cannot simply follow the instructions of the parties in deciding what
context, if any, should be relevant in resolving disputed transactions.'
49 See infra Part III.B.
50 To be sure, disputing parties can introduce their novel contracts into evidence, but
these contextualizing regimes typically rely on a complex combination of formal and
informal mechanisms that are unlike traditional contractual forms and have not been pre-
viously analyzed by scholars specializing in contract theory. In the absence of an emerging
academic consensus as to how and why these novel forms function as they do, a generalist
court is placed at a severe disadvantage if called upon to determine the respective obliga-
tions of the parties. That disadvantage is exacerbated by the fact that the dispute will result
in the court being presented with two self-serving accounts of the novel contract where the
existence of the novelty degrades the court's capacity to determine which account (or com-
bination of accounts) is "right." See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1, at
601-05 (discussing the difficulties that courts face in determining whether to fill gaps in
contracts between sophisticated parties with established legal standards or to assume that
the parties had intended to reject such standards); Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9, at
26-29 ("Generalist courts are removed from the context and impaired in their ability to
divine how and when parties would braid both text and context in their contracts.").
51 Despite the academic debate over whether the default rule of interpretation for
generalist courts should encourage scrutiny of context or limit it to the text of the agree-
ment, the overwhelming majority of common law courts continue to follow the traditional
"formalist" approach to contract interpretation, in which courts respect the instructions of
sophisticated commercial parties as found in merger clauses and reject appeals by plaintiffs
to consider extrinsic evidence not found in the integrated written contract. Schwartz &
Scott, Contract Interpretation, supra note 1, at 928 n.1.
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As a consequence, it becomes more important for the court to inde-
pendently affirm values and methods that accord with those of the
bilateral regime. The more the court does so, the more likely it will
arrive at concordant decisions, whether or not it expressly takes note
of the regime's existence. But courts that disavow the goals and
methods of a contextualizing regime may, either knowingly or inad-
vertently, set aside the results determined through the parties' regime
in favor of outcomes closer to their own preferences. 52
Seen this way, courts are not well positioned to interpret con-
tracts for innovation and search-supporting preliminary agreements in
accordance with the parties' intentions. Most contemporary courts are
generalists. They operate in a heterogeneous and rapidly changing
economy, of which their institutional situation affords little detailed
knowledge or experience.53 Unsurprisingly, such courts are prone to
undermine an emergent innovation by inadvertently failing to extract
the correct meaning from the signals that the parties have given.54
52 Contextualizing regimes can be fragile and, as a result, the innovations they produce
can be short-lived. A much discussed example of this vulnerability is insurance law. In
insurance litigation from roughly the 1960s through the end of the 1980s, courts modified
general rules of contract to reach decisions protecting consumer interests while also cre-
ating incentives for insurers and regulators to clarify and strengthen the overall regime.
One of the most important adjustments of general doctrine was the elaboration of a strong
variant of contra proferentem, under which a court, encountering an ambiguity in an agree-
ment, immediately decides for the policyholder, rather than undertaking the usual inter-
pretive efforts to determine the parties' meaning. Another was judicial defense of the
policyholder's reasonable expectations of coverage, explicit language in the agreement not-
withstanding. However, after a long period in which generalist judges modified common
law doctrines to create, in effect, a contract law for insurance, recent courts have under-
mined the doctrinal structure they had created. This outcome might have been avoided if
courts, instead of re-imposing general contract doctrines, had instead used their power of
administrative review to induce regulators to seek clarification of insurance terms and poli-
cies. In that case, the doctrinal adjustments would have functioned as a judicially adminis-
tered incentive system-rewarding clarity achieved by the parties under the regulator's
aegis, and penalizing failure to achieve this result-rather than as an open-ended invitation
to judges themselves to determine in particular cases what the parties ought to have
intended. For discussion, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 9, at 53-56.
53 The claim of generalist judicial competence was true under historical circumstances
that no longer prevail: The early English courts of equity were effectively able to contextu-
alize contracts because they functioned within homogeneous communities, and thus were
able to recover the context surrounding interpretive disputes. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
supra note 9, at 18 ("In effect, fifteenth century courts of equity were specialized in the
narrow range of activities that came before them. In contrast, contemporary courts are
operating in a heterogeneous and rapidly changing economy. . . ."). At the same time, the
institutional posture of contemporary courts, which requires them to wait for parties to
bring a dispute to them, affords them no window on larger commercial practice and, hence,
"little detailed knowledge or experience." Id.
54 Generalist courts can err in several different ways. They can, for example, interpret
formal terms that are intended merely to supplement the underlying context (including the
default rules of contract such as the doctrine of excuse) as trumping the context and its
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There is no reason to think that judges, exceptionally, will have
knowledge of the circumstances that motivate the innovation
expressed in collaborative contracting and novel types of preliminary
agreements. Nor will the bilateral contextualizing regime created in
the contract necessarily put them on notice that they are entering
unknown territory. The information-exchange regime created within
collaborating firms and between collaborating partners by the innova-
tive braiding of formal and informal contracting elements is the most
inward-facing and the least outwardly visible form of such regimes.
Moreover, preliminary agreements in their traditional form-in
which, for example, two commercial parties agree to investigate
together the prospects of a commercial project and agree to negotiate
the remaining terms of the contract once they can observe the fruits of
their efforts-are historically unenforceable under the indefiniteness
doctrine of the common law of contracts.55 So to the extent that
defaults. See, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. 989, 992
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (concluding that while "the contract contemplated that foreseeable cost
increases would be passed on to the buyer," its inclusion of "a specific provision which put
a ceiling on contract price increases resulting from [cost increases] impels the conclusion
that the parties intended" for the seller to bear "the risk of a substantial and unforeseen
rise in .. . cost[s]"); Mo. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979) (denying seller's claim for excuse because seller "agreed to the use of the
Industrial Commodities Index"). Alternatively, courts can commit the converse error by
interpreting formal terms that were intended to serve as trumps-and thus signal parties'
intent to opt out of the normal context-as merely supplementing the typical regime. See,
e.g., Brunswick Box Co. v. Coutinho, Caro & Co., 617 F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating
that course of performance and surrounding context suggest that standard meaning of
F.A.S. term might not be applicable); Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3,
10-11 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that course of dealing and usage of trade, if admitted in
evidence, demonstrate that express price and quantity terms in written contract were only
fair estimates); Modine Mfg. Co. v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-41 (Tex.
App. 1973) (finding that the lower court erred in excluding trade usage testimony as to the
meaning of the express term "[c]apacities shall not be less than indicated" (quoting
Modine's bid)). For further discussion, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits
of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 283-86 (1985).
55 See generally ROBERT E. Scorr & JoDY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY
29-41, 299-303 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing indefinite agreements). Two factual patterns
typify unenforceable indefinite agreements at common law. The first, illustrated by Varney
v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1916), is the indefinite bonus contract. In Varney, the New
York Court of Appeals found a bonus agreement for "a fair share of [the] profits" to be
too indefinite and thus unenforceable. Id. at 823-24 (quoting plaintiff testimony). The
second archetype is a variation on the first, extending the common law rule to agreements
where essential terms were explicitly left to further negotiation. For example, in Petze v.
Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 109 N.Y.S. 328 (App. Div. 1908), the New York appellate
court held that an agreement providing that "the method of accounting to determine the
net distributable profits is to be agreed upon later" was unenforceable under the indefi-
niteness rule. Id. at 329-33. Since then, common law courts have consistently found "agree-
ments to agree" unenforceable if any essential term was open to negotiation. Scorr &
KRAUS, supra, at 35.
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generalist courts might be said to have a prior and independent dispo-
sition concerning the outcome produced by the innovative contextual-
izing regime, that disposition is unfavorable to the emergent
innovation.
Despite these impediments, courts have in some cases enforced
collaborative contracts and new preliminary agreements in terms that
support the purposes of the contextualizing regime that the parties
have created. 56 As we discuss below, however, the doctrinal recogni-
tion of innovation in contract remains incomplete and in some regards
murky.57 This lack of clarity can further impede innovation by making
the innovation's fate even more uncertain.
2. Low-Powered Enforcement of Collaborative Contracts
The effectiveness of the collaborative contracts discussed in this
Part depends centrally on courts enforcing the chosen methods of
mutual cooperation on terms consistent with the underlying arrange-
ments. The function of collaborative contracts is to address the high
level of uncertainty confronting the parties-neither the products nor
their specifications can be set out ex ante-by creating a process
through which the parties will jointly develop this information and
learn about each other's capabilities. This function and the parties'
decision to locate the process of collaboration in a formal contract
dictates the scope of legal enforcement: A party to such a formal col-
laboration contract is legally obligated to adhere to its commitment to
invest concurrently in the information that will determine the feasi-
bility of a proposed project. As in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere
Technologies, Inc.,58 the key is to discourage parties from defecting
early in the relationship, before a robust pattern of cooperation has
had the time to develop.59 But once the investments are made, formal
56 See infra notes 58-59 and text accompanying notes 63-72.
57 See cases cited infra notes 62, 72. For an analysis of the litigated preliminary agree-
ment cases and of the ambiguous doctrinal formulations of contemporary courts, see
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 48, at 691-702.
58 408 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Ind. 2006). The court held that the parties to this pharma-
ceutical/biotech collaboration had entered into a form of cooperative agreement that had
important-and legally enforceable-limits. Id. at 690, 696-97. When Lilly subsequently
undertook secret research projects, using information that had been jointly developed, it
not only risked a claim of patent infringement, but it breached the contract that gave it the
limited license in the first place. Id. at 691-93. Holding that Lilly had therefore forfeited its
investment in the joint project, the court concluded that "Lilly has asserted theories to
justify its actions under the contracts, but those theories are not supported by the evidence
or the law." Id. at 697. For discussion, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1416-18.
59 A result similar to that in Emisphere was reached in the analogous case of Medinol
Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), which we have previ-
ously discussed in Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1417 n.132. In Medinol, the
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enforcement should not influence whether the project should go for-
ward and on what terms. Put differently, the parties have created a
regime to determine the context of their relationship, with the court's
role limited to policing the relationship, not enforcing the outcome.
It then follows that a reviewing court's primary focus should be
on character rather than capability: Has one party reneged on its
promise to invest in open information exchange and, if so, what is the
appropriate sanction? Low-powered sanctions that encourage compli-
ance with the information-exchange regime (and the informal rela-
tions it supports) should be imposed. High-powered sanctions like
expectation damages, which might function to crowd out the informal
mechanisms that support performance, should be avoided.60 Indeed,
we are beginning to see just this distinction: In leading cases, courts
are punishing overt abuse of information-exchange regimes.61 But
because the formal sanction applies only to the commitment to col-
laborate, only reliance damages are awarded for the breach of that
commitment; the sanction does not extend to the award of profits that
might have been earned had the project gone forward. Within this
framework of limited sanctions, the collaboration commitment can
achieve its goal of generating both information and trust.62 While
parties entered into a "close and extensive contractual relationship, relating to research,
development, manufacturing, and distribution of stents . . . ." Medinol, 346 F. Supp. 2d at
581. The contract contemplated ongoing collaboration in research as well as the develop-
ment and production of the resulting product. Medinol was to manufacture the stents and
Boston Scientific was to sell them in the United States under license from Medinol. The
parties agreed that Medinol would establish an "Alternative Line" for manufacturing
stents, which Boston Scientific would be permitted to operate under license from Medinol
so as to reduce the risk of supply disruptions. Id. at 584-85. That license was limited to "the
operation of the Alternative Line." Id. at 597-98. Boston Scientific then set up a secret
manufacturing operation outside the scope of the Alternative Line. Although there was no
express covenant against such manufacture, the court found that the parties' close collabo-
rative relationship showed that the unauthorized manufacturing amounted to a breach of
contract, id. at 598, without limiting Medinol to a patent infringement suit. The court fur-
ther found that Boston Scientific's stealth and secrecy showed it had acted in bad faith by
setting up the unauthorized line. Id. at 596. The court granted summary judgment for
Medinol on liability for the breach, leaving only the issue of damages for trial. Id. at
592-600. See also Shaw v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 226 A.2d 903, 906-07 (Vt.
1967) (affirming a damage award for the breach of an implied covenant not to use a patent
beyond the scope of the license).
60 For a discussion of the risk of crowding out and the ways in which formal enforce-
ment of collaborative contracts can function as a complement rather than as a substitute
for informal enforcement, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1398-402.
61 Id. at 1416-21; see, e.g., Emisphere, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 689-91 (granting contractual
remedy for breach of collaborative agreement); Medinol, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 609 (same).
62 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1416. As might be anticipated in an emer-
gent area of law, the decisions of courts called on to enforce braided contracts are not
uniformly consistent with the enforcement theory we have developed here. Some decisions
invite the award of damages for parties who participate faithfully in the information
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there is some evidence that courts are wisely limiting the sanctions
they impose on parties who breach their commitment to collaborate,
these institutional forms of innovation remain fragile, and the degree
to which courts will properly respect the parties' own design is still far
from settled.
3. Preliminary Agreements in the Courts
Recently, perhaps as a general response to increased uncertainty
and the need to search for a collaborator discussed above, courts have
effected a major shift in the common law's aversion to preliminary
agreements by relaxing the rule under which parties are either fully
bound or not bound at all. Instead, a new contract rule has emerged
that enforces "a mutual commitment to negotiate together in good
faith in an effort to reach final agreement .... "63 But the new rule
governing preliminary agreements to collaborate-creating a legal
exchange regime but then decide that it is not profitable for them to pursue the joint pro-ject. See, e.g., Tan v. Allwaste, Inc., No. 96 C 3558, 1997 WL 337207, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June
11, 1997) (finding the plaintiff's claim survived summary judgment because a reasonablejury could conclude that the defendant "simply backed out of the deal for reasons unre-
lated to Geotrack's actions, omissions, or financial status"). Other decisions contemplate,
or at least invite the possibility of, the award of full expectation damages-that is, high-
powered enforcement-for breach of the information-exchange obligation. See, e.g.,
Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[I]f the
plaintiff can prove that had it not been for the defendant's bad faith the parties would have
made a final contract . . . the defendant is liable for that loss-liable, that is, for the plain-
tiff's consequential damages."); VS & A Commc'ns Partners, L.P. v. Palmer Broad. Ltd.
P'ship, Civ. A. No. 12521, 1992 WL 339377, at *8-9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16, 1992) (discussing
cases in which expectation damages were awarded against parties who were found not to
have negotiated in good faith). In both instances, these courts have failed to appreciate the
importance of limiting formal enforcement to low-powered sanctions focused on willful
violations of the collaboration agreement itself and thereby create the kind of incentives
that undo braiding by inducing strategic crowding out of informal enforcement. For discus-
sion, see Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1423-24.
63 Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). The rule originated with the opinion of Judge Pierre Leval in this case,
which we have discussed previously in Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1426 &
n.163. Id. Judge Leval identified two separate types of "preliminary agreements." He char-
acterized the first type as those cases where the parties have agreed on all material terms
but have also agreed to memorialize their agreement in a more formal document. Id. Dis-
putes arise primarily because parties have failed to express clearly their intention as to
when their arrangement would be legally enforceable. Here, the question is solely one of
timing-when have the parties manifested an intention to be legally bound? In contrast,
the second category of agreements concerns "binding preliminary commitments," the pre-
liminary agreements we analyze here. Id. In this latter case, the parties agree on certain
terms but leave possibly important terms open to further negotiation. This requires courts
to determine whether such an agreement had been made, what the duty to bargain in good
faith entails, and which remedy should be awarded for breach of that duty. This framework
has been followed in at least thirteen states, sixteen federal district courts, and seven fed-
eral circuits. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 48, at 691-93 & n.7.
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duty to bargain in good faith but not requiring the parties to agree-is
only a first step in solving the parties' contracting problem. 64 The
courts must now give content to this rule by determining the nature of
the sanction to be imposed when one party seeks to use the novel
form of collaborative agreement to opportunistically exploit the
counterparty.
In re Matterhorn Group, Inc. is an example. 65 Swatch determined
that greater watch sales (and profits) were available if it could expand
its franchise operations in the United States. To this end, Matterhorn
and Swatch agreed to collaborate, each investing in the exploration of
the possibility of a long-term relationship. 66 The parties signed a letter
of intent that granted Matterhorn the exclusive franchise to distribute
Swatch watches for thirty possible sites.67 In turn, Matterhorn agreed
to invest in finding appropriate retail locations from among the list in
the letter of intent. Swatch committed to process diligently
Matterhorn's applications for franchises at potentially profitable loca-
tions, and then to seek financing and approval of franchises at
Matterhorn's chosen locations from its parent firm. Thereafter,
Swatch engaged in just the form of strategic behavior that might be
expected under these circumstances: It delayed processing several
franchise applications and did not secure the necessary approvals. 68
The court found that Swatch breached its preliminary agreement
to bargain in good faith and awarded Matterhorn reliance
damages-measured by the cost it had incurred in investigating the
locations in question. 69 Importantly, however, the court declined to
award Matterhorn expectation damages based on lost profits, con-
cluding that "there is no guarantee that it would have opened a store
in [that location]."70 In essence, Swatch was ordered to pay for the
option on new locations that Swatch had in effect purchased from
Matterhorn. However, the court also did not protect Matterhorn from
Swatch's decision not to exercise that option. Had the court done so,
the result could have had crowding out effects by attaching a risk of
large damages to a formal agreement that established a contextual-
izing regime.
6 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1427.
65 No. 97 B 41274, 2002 WL 31528396 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002). We have previ-
ously discussed this case in Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1428-29.
66 Id. at 2.
67 Id. at 3.
68 Id. at 16-17 (holding that Swatch "unilaterally rescinded the exclusivity that the
Letter of Intent had granted" and "breached the Letter of Intent by rejecting the Vail
application for improper reasons").
69 Id. at 17.
70 Id.
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Matterhorn, thus, supports the view that narrowly defined duties
of a good-faith commitment to a formal collaborative process comple-
ment a regime primarily dependent on informal enforcement of sub-
stantive obligations.71 A braiding mechanism, such as the one that the
court in Matterhorn appears to have validated, reinforces the informal
mechanisms on which the ultimate business arrangement is built; it
creates an opportunity for reciprocity and trust to evolve by imposing
a low-powered complement during the early stages of collaboration. 72
By limiting formal enforcement to only the collaborative aspect, the
crowding out phenomenon can be avoided.
But generalist courts have not uniformly understood the limited
role of legal enforcement in these preliminary agreements. In several
notable cases, the court has failed to fully embrace the notion that an
enforceable preliminary agreement only requires a party to undertake
a promised investment in acquiring and sharing information.73 And in
cases involving letters of intent in corporate acquisitions, very good
judges have held out the potential for expectation damages for failure
to negotiate in good faith.74 Limiting the obligation narrowly to the
commitment to a process rather than to an outcome in this way should
permit a party to properly obtain summary judgment even though it
walks away from the transaction for reasons wholly unrelated to the
actions of the counterparty. And, even if the promised investment in
71 For a further example of a court declining to impose legal sanctions to enforce a
preliminary agreement in the absence of evidence of opportunism, see Kandel v. Ctr. for
Urological Treatment & Research, P.C, No. M2000-02128-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 598567,
at *7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2002), which held that a defendant physician's group did
not breach its duty to negotiate in good faith with the plaintiff over an agreement to
purchase stock.
72 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1429. In Braiding, we apply this analysis to
the interpretation of letters of intent in connection with corporate acquisitions. Id. at
1439-44. As we note in that connection, courts have not been uniformly modest in limiting
the level of enforcement for breach of these agreements. In several notable cases, courts
have held out the possibility that high-powered sanctions for breach of preliminary agree-
ments could be imposed in some cases, suggesting a misunderstanding of the limited role
that they should play in superintending these contextualizing regimes. Id.; see also, e.g.,
Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting
that expectation damages may be available in proper cases); VS & A Commc'ns Partners v.
Palmer Broad. Ltd. P'ship, Civ. A. No. 12521, 1992 WL 339377, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 16,
1992) (same).
73 See, e.g., Venture Assocs. Corp., 96 F.3d at 278 (noting that expectation damages may
be available in proper cases); JamSports & Entm't, LLC v. Paradama Prods., Inc., 336 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 847-48 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (arguing that insistence on new conditions could
constitute a violation of duty to negotiate in good faith, depending on the circumstances);
Tan v. Allwaste, Inc., No. 96 C 3558, 1997 WL 337207, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 1997)
(finding that the question of whether the defendant, in breaking off negotiations, acted in
bad faith was a question of fact for the jury to resolve). For further discussion, see Gilson,
Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1440-44.
74 See cases cited supra note 72.
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collaboration is not made, the defendant's liability is properly limited
to the plaintiff's investment in the collaborative process and not to the
expectancy that might result from a concluded deal.75
4. Summary
In sum, courts support the innovation in these bilateral regimes
by recognizing the braiding of an enforceable formal contract covering
collaborative assessment of a business opportunity and an unenforce-
able informal contract covering the substantive transaction should
both parties exercise their respective options to go forward. No legal
consequences flow from a party's decision not to proceed; neither
party has a right to demand performance of the contemplated transac-
tion. If the parties cannot ultimately agree on a final contract, they
may abandon the deal. Both parties thus enter into an option on the
ultimate deal, which is exercisable after the parties learn the informa-
tion produced through the preliminary investments, and the price of
which is the cost of the preliminary investment.76
In the case of disputes arising under contracting for innovation,
or the related arrangements for collaborative search, the courts that
support the innovation are those that, in effect, discern the existence
of these innovative governance structures and conform their decisions
to the parties' purposes by respecting the arrangements the parties
have created. As we have noted, however, in many other settings con-
textualizing regimes are institutionalized outside of firms and the
bilateral relations they create. Here, the outputs of the regimes are
more conspicuous, though not necessarily easier for courts to inter-
pret; indeed, these structures often may not involve courts at all. It is
to those multilateral settings that we turn next.
III
MULTILATERAL CONTEXTUALIZING REGIMES:
THE EFFECT OF SCALE
All else equal, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more diffi-
cult it is for parties to write, and courts to interpret, complete, state-
contingent contracts. If the parties cannot predict probabilistically the
range of future outcomes, the if-then framework of a state-contingent
contract necessarily will be incomplete. All else equal, the greater the
number of traders engaged in the same kind of a transaction, the more
75 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 19, at 1444.
76 For a formal model supporting this argument, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 48, at
676-91, in which the authors show that an award of reliance damages rather than expec-
tancy damages for breach of a preliminary agreement resolves the ex post holdup problem.
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likely that the contracting infrastructure-both terms adapted to cur-
rent need in the form of standard contracts and industry codes, as well
as a mechanism for adjusting terms as needs change-will be providedjointly as a club- or industry-specific public good by a trade associa-
tion alone or in collaboration with public authorities. We have just
seen how shocks in the economic environment produce innovations in
contractual form in bilateral relationships. These regimes arise when
markets are thin and uncertainty is high. Similarly, exogenous factors
can stimulate the creation of innovative contractual forms in multilat-
eral contextualizing regimes. In such a case, the regimes are institu-
tionalized outside the participating firms and arise when markets are
thick-many contracting parties are affected by the same exogenous
event or, even in the absence of an exogenous event, many parties are
acting in the same commercial environment.
In this Part, we consider those contextualizing regimes that are
external to the specific contracting parties to a transaction-multilat-
eral regimes that arise under conditions of low through high uncer-
tainty. In Part III.A, we consider the type of multilateral regime that
arises when uncertainty is low and the problem is profound official
ignorance of insider practices within a common environment. The
exemplar here is the contextualist regime governing the U.S. cotton
market. We also discuss the rules developed for fast-track construction
and construction management. In these thick general transaction mar-
kets, as uncertainty increases, important idiosyncrasies associated with
particular transactions arise. Part III.B considers a particularly inter-
esting multilateral contextualist regime: the Delaware Court of
Chancery. Here we find an environment of thick general transactions
but with greater uncertainty and, thus, particular transaction idiosyn-
crasies. Finally, Part III.C takes up the type of multilateral contextu-
alist regime that evolves when uncertainty is high, and ignorance of
the precise nature of threats and opportunities presented by the
change in the business environment is universal. In the market for
leafy greens, all actors can (and must) collaborate in the joint elabora-
tion of innovative procedures to mitigate the risks to food safety that
they confront.
A. Low Uncertainty and the Problem of Ignorance
Take first the setting where commercial practices are stable and
well understood by a substantial community of traders. Uncertainty is
low and markets are thick. But despite the regularities of dealings, and
the trading community's easy familiarity with both patterns of dealing
and the distinctive vulnerabilities to which they can give rise, the
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generalist judge cannot reasonably be expected to have knowledge of
such trade practices or be able to obtain it conveniently. The problem
here, in other words, is that the state's designated decisionmaker is
(and will likely remain) largely ignorant of the common knowledge of
the trade, and unthinking application of traditional contract law prin-
ciples will disrupt, rather than buttress, trade practice.77 Coping with
the adverse consequences of judicial ignorance, including moral
hazard-based litigation brought by parties who have been disadvan-
taged by trade practices in a particular transaction and seek to take
advantage of that ignorance, stimulates innovation by the affected
trade association or other collective body.78 The goal of the contextu-
alizing regime that emerges is to innovate in ways that (1) render
insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated into everyday
contracting, (2) establish methods for the expeditious resolution of
disputes arising under these agreements, and (3) institutionalize a pro-
cess for keeping terms and forms of dispute resolution abreast of
developments in the economic environment.
One variant of this kind of contextualizing regime is based on
private ordering, to the de facto exclusion of courts and administrative
77 To be sure, one might argue that in a low-uncertainty, multilateral environment,
generalist courts can entertain evidence from the disputing parties as to the common
practice or trade. But the problem is that in modern heterogeneous economies, trade prac-
tices are both complex and widely varied across industry groups. Some parties may, for
example, wish to separate the legal norms that govern their written agreement from the
informal norms that govern their actions. Under these circumstances, courts err if they
permit the evidence of common practice to trump the formal terms of the agreement.
Moreover, the available evidence suggests that courts, perhaps mindful of the risks, gener-
ally do not undertake careful evidentiary hearings to determine the precise nature of the
relevant context in a contractual dispute. See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in
Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMMERCIAL AND CORPORATE LAw 149,
166-67 & n.68 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000); Imad D. Abyad, Note,
Commercial Reasonableness in Karl Llewellyn's Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence,
83 VA. L. REV. 429, 452 (1997) ("The courts in effect are abrogating the responsibility that
the Code drafters assigned to them by treating commercial reasonableness as garden-
variety reasonableness, left for the lay juries to decide on a case-by-case basis with no
systematic structure resulting from their decisions."); Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in the
Courts: The Flawed Evidentiary Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy 20-21 (2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (offering
empirical evidence to show that courts typically rely on unreliable evidence to establish
usages). This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking expertise, fall back instead on
interested party testimony and generic concepts of reasonable commercial behavior rather
than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions. The lack of any systematic
inquiry into actual practices may also reflect the fact that any context evidence that is
introduced must be evaluated in an environment of extreme moral hazard where one party
who is disappointed by fate seeks to persuade the court to shift the relevant risk to the
counterparty.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 90-94.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
201April 2013]1
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
agencies. Trade associations not only establish procedures for fixing
and updating trade rules and technical terms, but also establish arbi-
tral bodies to resolve disputes that arise under the collectively speci-
fied rules and terms. The contextualizing regime in the U.S. cotton
industry, which originated in the mid-nineteenth century and took on
its modern form in the 1920s, is a prominent example of this cluster of
functions. 79
Dealers in cotton are organized in the American Cotton Shippers
Association (ACSA); the textile mills to which they sell are organized
in the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI).so The
ACSA and the ATMI have jointly adopted the Southern Mill Rules(SMRs) to govern transactions between their members.81 The SMRs
are revised annually, and changes are announced at annual meetings
and widely circulated. 82 New members are encouraged to attend a
summer course to familiarize themselves with the most important
rules.83 The two trade associations have established a joint arbitration
'9 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MIcH. L. REV. 1724, 1749-54(2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton]. For discussion of analogous multilateral regimes,
see generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1771-77 (1996) (discussing
rules of the National Grain and Feed Association, which requires that all disputes among
members must be submitted to the Association's arbitration system); Lisa Bernstein,
Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relationships in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115, 115 (1992) ("[D]iamond industry disputes are resolved not
through the courts and not by the application of legal rules announced and enforced by the
state.").
80 Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 79, at 1726.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1772 ("Rule changes are announced at annual meetings, publicized through
association circulars, and are sometimes discussed in the trade press. New merchants are
strongly encouraged to attend the eight-week summer Cotton Institute that includes
courses on the content of the most important sets of trading rules."). The most recent
revision of the SMRs was adopted in 2004. See Am. Cotton Shippers Ass'n, Southern Mill
Rules (2004), available at http://www.acsa-cotton.org/rules-and-policies/southern-mill-
rules. According to prominent representatives of the relevant trade organizations polled in
an informal telephone survey on condition of confidentiality, this is because no one has
since felt the need to propose any amendments. Thus, the procedure recited in the text is
still in place. According to the respondents, increased consolidation of the industry over
the last fifteen years on both the buyer and seller sides has essentially eliminated the need(for now) to amend the SMRs. More specifically, as more and more of the industry oper-
ates overseas, the domestic textile community has grown smaller and more tightly knit.
Fewer players but bigger players are left, and "everyone knows the rules." The merchant
response implies that the SMRs have not been amended not because the industry has not
changed, but rather because the extralegal enforcement mechanisms followed in the
industry have been strengthened due to domestic industry consolidation. Telephone
Interviews by Kalliope Kefallinos with Industry Representatives and Cotton Merchants(May 8-10, 2012) (interviews were conducted on condition of confidentiality).
83 Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 79, at 1772.
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panel, the Board of Appeals (BoA), to hear all disputes under the
SMRs except those concerning quality, which are referred to a sepa-
rate body, the Cotton States Arbitration Board (CSAB).84
Annual review by the trade associations assures that regularities
in trade practice that contribute to generally beneficial outcomes are
identified and incorporated into the SMRs.85 As Bernstein notes,
"given the amount of detail in the trade rules, cases involving contrac-
tual gaps are uncommon." 86 In fact, given the clarity and comprehen-
sive character of the rules, disputes of any kind under the rules are
infrequent. The BoA hears on average just two cases per year.87 Low
uncertainty allows for the development of the collective equivalent of
state-contingent contracting, and an expert arbitration process
reduces the likelihood of arbitrator error. Thus, there remains little to
be resolved by litigation.
Here, too, we observe a variant of the braiding of formal and
informal enforcement mechanisms. Decisionmaking by the BoA is
textualist, with great attention to the letter of the contract in dispute
and next to none for the context of the transaction it governs.88 Con-
textual variations in individual transactions-for example, the willing-
ness (or not) of a dealer to accommodate a mill by delivering before
or after the contracted date-are assumed by the BoA to be the
informal and reciprocal adjustments that both parties make to main-
tain dealings in a world that neither can fully control. 89 Parties will
normally make several such adjustments before resorting to arbitra-
tion.90 If there were any risk that the BoA would interpret such
adjustments of the agreement as binding in the future, parties would
be more reluctant to make them, and relations would become more
brittle-again, as the behavioralists fear, formal contracting would
drive out informal contracting. 91 Instead, the expectation of adjust-
ments from trade terms in particular transactions represents an
informal contract enforced by the expectation of repeated dealings
between the parties and the importance of reputation in dealings with
84 Id. at 1727.
85 See id. at 1726 n.7 (indicating that rules committees meet at least annually but that
revision is slow when interests are not aligned).
86 Id. at 1736.
87 Id. at 1762. But see infra note 112 (citing recent evidence in the cotton industry
showing that higher uncertainty correlates with an increased number of disputes, as par-
ties' potential losses rise).
88 See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 79, at 1735-37 (contrasting the adjudicative
approach of courts with that of cotton industry arbitration tribunals).
89 See id. at 1743-44 (describing the informal flexibility of transactors and the impor-
tance of adjudicative unwillingness to transform this flexibility into an obligation).
90 Id. at 1775-76.
91 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (reviewing behavioralist literature).
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future industry counterparties. These informal adjustments are
ignored by the textualist arbitrators; the presence of formal con-
tracting supports the operation of informal contracting.
Damage rules in the formal enforcement process are also set to
encourage braiding of formal and informal contractual elements.
Monetary damages are set high enough to make it unprofitable to
breach a contract to take advantage of price volatility, but are gener-
ally "under-compensatory" in making no provision for recouping
foregone profit through expectation damages. 92 Formal penalties are
then supplemented by private ones imposed by members of the com-
munity of transactors, resulting in what Bernstein calls "hybrid" (or in
our terms "braided") sanctions that remind wrongdoers of their obli-
gations and allow the parties to transactions in distress to arrive, infor-
mally, at mutually acceptable remedies, but that provide no
inducement to manipulate the formal rules for selfish gain.93
The innovations in contractual processes that are created by trade
associations such as the ACSA and ATMI are customarily protected
by their formal removal from the supervision of generalist
courts-most merchant-to-mill contracts provide for arbitration by
the BoA.94 But regimes of this type are not inherently private in the
sense of depending on complete insulation from public institutions.
Rather, the trade associations themselves set the terms of engagement
with public institutions. We see this in the cotton industry. To take
advantage of the recent improvements in quality measurement instru-
ments, the SMRs have incorporated reference to a grading system
maintained by the Department of Agriculture, and the CSAB accord-
ingly relies on the public grades as well.9 5 Moreover, when collective
92 Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 79, at 1733 ("[T]he damage measures in the SMRs and
the MCE Trading Rules tend to be under-compensatory."). There has been a great deal of
price volatility in cotton since 2011, with the price rising to an all-time high in March 2011
($2.2967/1b) and coming down to less than $0.90/lb today. Cotton Monthly Price - U.S.
Cents Per Pound, INDEXMUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=
cotton&months=60 (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). This price volatility has led to an extraordi-
nary surge in breaches of sales contracts between farmers and merchants and merchants
and mills, and a corresponding increase in strain on the arbitration system. Michael
Rothfeld & Carolyn Cui, Plague of Broken Contracts Frays Cotton Market, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 30, 2012, at Al.
93 See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 79, at 1783-85 (describing the process of encour-
aging cooperation through "hybrid-sanctions").
94 Id. at 1727.
95 See Cotton States Arbitration Rules, AM. CorroN SHIPPERS Ass'N, http://www.acsa-
cotton.org/rules-and-policies/smr-cotton-states-arbitration-rules (last visited Feb. 13, 2013)
("Rule 15: The basis of all arbitrations for grade and/or staple shall be the Official
Universal Cotton Standards of the United States Department of Agriculture for grade and/
or the Official Cotton Standards of the United States Department of Agriculture for length
of staple . . . .").
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action problems thwart private coordination, contextualizing regimes
of this type can also be created by statute and administered by public
agencies. 96
Multilateral contextualizing regimes may also use common law
courts to create precedents as a means of standardizing novel terms as
they evolve. In contrast to the cotton industry's walling off of gener-
alist courts through mandatory expert arbitration, such standardiza-
tion has been stimulated in construction contracting through the
offices of key intermediaries such as the American Institute of
Architects and the Associated General Contractors. 97 One particu-
larly instructive illustration is the response of these two trade organi-
zations to the contracting challenges produced by the development of
fast-track construction and the construction management model of
design-build contracting. 98 During the 1970s, each of these two rival
organizations produced a competing set of model forms that defined
the contractual obligations and risks associated with the use of a
96 In "The Significance of an Institutional System: The Case of the Spoiled
Cantaloupes," an extended section in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 10-68
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994), the authors describe just such a
contextualizing regime for the regulation of contracting in perishable agricultural commod-
ities. The regime was initially created to respond to "the rejection evil." Id. at 40. When
prices fell against them, buyers evaded their commitments by using minor nonconformities
as pretexts to reject. Small shippers were typically unable to salvage rejected goods or to
pursue litigation in distant locales. The dispersed and fragmented character of the industry
impeded trade associations' efforts to address the problem for decades. Id. In 1930,
Congress passed the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), which makes it a
violation of federal law for "any dealer to reject or fail to deliver ... without reasonable
cause any perishable agricultural commodity" in an interstate transaction. 7 U.S.C.
§ 499b(2) (2006). The Act instructs the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations
to guide interpretation of contract terms allocating risks specific to the industry between
buyers and sellers, operate an arbitration process to adjudicate claims at reasonable costs,
and administer a licensing scheme to screen irresponsible buyers and sellers from the
industry. HART & SACKS, supra, at 33-34. In practice, contract terms were elaborated with
the close cooperation of private trade associations. Id., at 41-42, 44. Thus, in this case, too,
sanctions are set so as to facilitate braiding. For further discussion of this case, see Sabel &
Simon, supra note 2, at 1277-78.
97 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 54, at 303 ("Trade organizations provide a mechanism
to internalize at least some of the gains from contractual innovation."). For further discus-
sion of standardization of contractual terms and subsequent testing of such terms in courts,
see Scott, supra note 77, and Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 868-69 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, The Case for
Formalism].
98 The fast-track process is a "method of construction by which actual construction is
commenced prior to the completion of all design, planning, bidding and subcontracting
stages in order to alleviate the effects of inflation." Meathe v. State Univ. Constr. Fund,
410 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (App. Div. 1978).
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construction manager. 99 Versions of these forms have been widely
adopted by contracting parties within the industry and subsequently
have been tested in both litigation before generalist courts and con-
sensual arbitration where the parties select the presumably expert
arbitrators.100
An evolving set of standardized "official" context-specific terms
that are easily observable by parties has emerged from this process. 101
Once standardization has been achieved, these forms typically specify
arbitration as the means of dispute resolution, thereby allowing the
parties to increase the experience of the decisionmaker who will
resolve disagreements over the terms of the standard forms.102 Impor-
tantly, these context-specific terms differ in critical ways from the col-
lective equivalent of state-contingent contracting arising in the cotton
industry. In the construction and construction-management contexts,
the transactions covered share general characteristics but differ signif-
icantly in ways peculiar to the particular project-unlike easily' grad-
able cotton, every building is different and the terms apply to
construction projects with very different scale and complexity.
Because there are more idiosyncrasies associated with this activity, the
multilateral contextualizing regime responds by emphasizing process
rather than specific outcomes, thereby taking advantage of generally
low uncertainty concerning the general transaction form while
retaining flexibility to address particular transactional features.
99 Scott, supra note 77, at 168; Scott, The Case for Formalism, supra note 97, at 869-70;
see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 54, at 296-97 & n.86, (citations omitted).
100 Scott, supra note 77, at 168; Scott, The Case for Formalism, supra note 97, at 870; see
also, e.g., Bolton Corp. v. T.A. Loving Co., 380 S.E.2d 796, 800-01 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989)
(applying plain meaning legal principles to an industry-wide prototype contract). For a
review of the testing of contract terms through arbitration, see Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the United States Construction Industry,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65 (1996).
101 Scale also matters with respect to designating the forum that will adjudicate disputes
concerning the performance of a contract. Analogous to form contracts, scale will support
specialized forums that will have the experience and expertise to understand and apply the
relevant context. Out of this testing process, a set of standardized terms emerges that col-
lectively reduces the risk of writing construction contracts. Cf Victor G. Trapasso, The
Lawyer's Use of AIA Construction Contracts, PRAc. LAw., May 1973, at 37 (advising attor-
neys to "be aware of the wide acceptance of AIA form instruments by the construction
industry").
102 By choosing arbitration, parties are able to select decisionmakers who have expertise
in the relevant industry. This is likely to result in more accurate outcomes and, thus, is
especially important with regard to novel contractual forms. See Christopher R. Drahozal
& Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to
Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 558-61 (2003) (suggesting that parties are
more likely to leave contract terms vague when they trust a decisionmaker to fill the gaps).
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B. The Delaware Chancery: The Specialized Court as a
Contextualizing Regime
Consider now a second circumstance like the construction
industry, where there are a large number of highly complex transac-
tions that broadly share general features and therefore reflect a thick
market for these features, but where each transaction has significant
idiosyncratic features and the common background conditions shift
rapidly. Put differently, the market is thick only in general and uncer-
tainty is high with respect to particular transactions. Here we examine
how a contextualizing regime-that contemplates a central role for
courts to provide a range of generally applicable rules, but which
nonetheless allows particularized responses when the idiosyncrasies of
a transaction are important-can develop. Like the construction
industry case, the emphasis is on process rather than detailed rules.103
Consider-from the perspective of a contextualizing regime that
responds to uncertainty and scale-how the legal rules governing the
obligations of boards of directors in corporate acquisitions are
applied. In this context, the uncertainty does not arise from the
unforeseeable, unintended consequences of incorporation of new
actors, products, and production processes into a highly interdepen-
dent endeavor, as we examine in the next section. Rather the uncer-
tainty arises through the strategic interaction of actors intent on
advancing their separate interests by manipulating open-ended stan-
dards in volatile environments that cannot be addressed by bright-line
rules. Actors in such an environment can take collective-if only par-
allel rather than coordinatedl 04-actions to reduce the very uncer-
tainty to which their own behavior contributes by independently
choosing to incorporate in the same jurisdiction. The goal is to reduce
the chance of judicial error in ex post application of vague standards
such as fiduciary duty. This collective action takes the form of reliance
on expert judges with significant experience in the field; reliance, that
is, on a specialized court of equity. 05 The specialization of the court
together with its equitable powers assure parties that, despite the
impossibility of codifying particularized decision rules, judicial
103 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 785, 803-04 (2003) (describing the Delaware Court of
Chancery's preference in freeze-out merger cases for applying fairness review processes
over determining the value of minority shares).
104 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 761 (1995) (describing how independent but parallel actions of parties
create network effects).
105 That the Delaware court is one of equity has an additional advantage: There are no
juries in a court of equity. A lay jury as the trier of fact is a significant independent source
of potential error in complex commercial cases.
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decisions will be taken with the fullest possible awareness of current
and evolving understandings of good practice. Like the pattern with
fast-track contracting,106 the focus is on process rather than on sub-
stantive facts. In turn, the scale necessary to reduce this judicial expe-
rience is achieved through parallel action in the choice of a state of
incorporation.
One way to understand why a majority of U.S. public corpora-
tions choose Delaware as an incorporation state is that it serves to
allocate to the Delaware Court of Chancery jurisdiction to resolve
fiduciary duty issues.107 Delaware corporate law is enabling; that is, it
gives corporations wide latitude to adopt specific rules governing their
behavior.108 In fact, however, Delaware corporations appear not to
accept that invitation, preferring to write articles of incorporation and
bylaws that largely address only formal issues such as meeting dates
and the like. This is because a corporation's circumstances and the
evolution of the market for corporate control are too uncertain to
specify ex ante conduct rules that will govern all of the corporation's
activities in the future. 109 The result of not specifying tailored rules is
that serious issues are covered instead by a vague standard-the
director and officer's overriding obligation of fiduciary duty-that is
applied by an expert court ex post." 0 Thus, a corporation assures that
the gaps in its articles of incorporation and bylaws resulting from
uncertainty will be filled by a court with the expertise necessary to
reduce the likelihood of erroneous decisions. It does this by incorpo-
rating in a jurisdiction where parallel private action has produced a
106 See supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
107 In the United States, the internal affairs doctrine dictates that the law of the state of
incorporation governs the corporation's internal affairs, including the scope and
application of fiduciary duties. JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & RONALD J.
GILSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONs 233-34 (7th ed. 2008).
108 WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 92 (3d ed. 2009)("The typical corporation statute of today, such as [Delaware's], is a nonregulatory, 'ena-
bling' statute .... ).
109 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAw 204 (1991) ("[F]irms go public in easy-to-acquire form: no poison pill
securities, no supermajority rules or staggered boards. Defensive measures are added later,
a sequence that reveals much.").
110 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are
Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the
Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. LAw. 877, 879-80 (2005) (arguing that Delaware
addresses managerial exploitation by equitable standards, not legal rules).
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sufficient scale of incorporations such that its judges have developed
the necessary experience and expertise.111
The cost of an ex post recourse to context, like its benefit, goes up
with uncertainty. Indeed, a crude generalization would be that an
increase in uncertainty more than proportionately increases the cost
of ex post recourse to context by generalist courts: The uncertainty
erodes constraints on judicial misuse of context and augments the
incentive for moral hazard-based litigation. But increasing the quality
of the adjudicator can change the relationship between uncertainty
and resort to context, reducing the probability of error and thus
increasing the potential benefits and reducing the potential costs. 1 12
This is what the Delaware Chancery does for sophisticated corporate
litigants attempting to come to grips with the uncertainty caused by
the litigants' own behavior in planning transactions ex ante: The
judges know the litigants' context well enough to reliably be able to
identify and sanction opportunistic behavior. Through this specializa-
tion, the Delaware Court of Chancery itself becomes a type of contex-
tualizing regime in which contractual innovation evolves.113
111 Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 1, 14 (2006),
and Klausner, supra note 104, at 845-46, address the advantage of a specialized Court of
Chancery in applying corporate law.
112 For example, in Lisa Bernstein's description of the role of the International Cotton
Advisory Committee in the cotton industry, industry-specified context operates to avoid
conflict in periods of low uncertainty; shared understandings and relational dealings reduce
the number of arbitrations. See Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 79, at 1762 ("[O]ne of the
most important ways that cotton industry institutions create value is by providing a social
and institutional transactional framework that effectively constrains opportunism and pro-
motes commercial cooperation in its shadow."). However, when uncertainty grows, the
number of disputes increases as a party's potential losses rise. In 2011, the unusual
volatility in cotton prices resulted in more defaults-reportedly some ten percent of all
commercial contracts-and more arbitration requests than any time since the start of
record-keeping in 2000. Leslie Josephs, Cotton Contracts, Made to Be Broken, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 25, 2011, at C4. In this circumstance, the International Cotton Advisory Committee,
the leading trade group and the designator of context, selects the arbitration panels. Id.
The use of industry expert arbitrators, who know the context, permits consideration of
context even as uncertainty increases, thus extending the range over which context can be
usefully incorporated before uncertainty so increases the risk of mistake and moral
hazard-based litigation that resort to context makes things worse: Increases in uncertainty
reduce, rather than increase, the utility of resort to context, and the curve turns down.
113 This account of the Delaware Court of Chancery as a contextualizing regime does
not address a destabilizing element that is peculiar to corporate law. Much corporate law
fiduciary litigation is brought by plaintiffs' lawyers representing shareholders generally,
rather than reflecting disagreements between corporations. Because plaintiffs' lawyers can
bring such cases in states other than Delaware even though Delaware corporate law and
precedent applies, the Delaware Court of Chancery can be avoided in cases where its
knowledge and experience would be particularly useful. Early empirical studies suggest
that this phenomenon may be significant. See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian
Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. 605, 624-25 (2012)
(citing the growth of important corporate cases filed outside of Delaware). We now may be
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C High Uncertainty and the Problem of Joint Risk Mitigation
Now we come to the corner position in our typology where mar-
kets are thick and uncertainty is high. 114 This domain has attracted
less scrutiny than the thick-market, low-uncertainty settings previ-
ously discussed, but its significance is rapidly increasing as a matter of
practical concern.' 15 Unlike the low-uncertainty, thick-market
domain, the central problem is not an information asymmetry where
judges are ignorant of established trade understandings or practices
that are familiar to practitioners. Rather, under conditions of high-
uncertainty neither generalists nor insiders are sure about the correct
approach to a particular problem. Hence the regime aims not to elab-
orate and codify established knowledge, but instead to organize mech-
anisms for joint problem solving. In this sense, the problem is the
thick-market analogue to bilateral contracting for innovation dis-
cussed in Part II, but with scale now making possible a collective facil-
itation of collaboration. This pattern is especially suited to efforts to
mitigate exogenous risks that can only be addressed through exacting,
common efforts by all market participants-where uncertainty is high
(all face a risk to which there is, ex ante, no well-defined and effective
response), but idiosyncrasy is low (given that individual solutions are
likely to be directly applicable, at least in part, to the problems of
others). Put differently, in the bilateral thin-market and high-
uncertainty case contracting parties collaborate for joint gains, while
in the thick-market and high-uncertainty case their goal is to reduce
the chances of the great harm to all industry participants that could be
caused by the failure of even one party to take precautions against
creating negative externalities affecting the whole industry. The goal
of the multilateral regime thus is to bring members together to create
bilateral arrangements that minimize the risk of general harm. In this
case, collective determination of acceptable practices goes hand in
hand with the determination of the conditions for contracting. 116
observing the early stages of a round of parallel activity to sustain a working contextual-
izing regime through the adoption of amendments to the corporation's charter that require
fiduciary litigation to be tried in the Court of Chancery. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The
History and Evolution of Intra-corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis,
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042758 (dis-
cussing suits "challenging the adoption of forum selection clauses in bylaw provisions
without prior shareholder approval").
114 The following material draws on an unpublished manuscript, Gilson, Sabel & Scott,
supra note 9, parts of which became portions of this Article.
115 See Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1278-79 (discussing the intersection of increased
uncertainty and heightened public safety concerns).
116 See id. at 1284-85 (discussing the respective roles of private contracting and regula-
tion in setting standards).
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Food safety illustrates the nature of the risks this type of contex-
tualizing regime addresses. As the supply chains for foodstuffs
lengthen and proliferate, the chances for pathogens to enter increase
exponentially. Processing rapidly propagates food contamination by
mixing of foodstuffs and secondary contamination of equipment.
Rapid distribution makes tainted foodstuffs widely available even as
first reports of the outbreak of food-borne illness accumulate.' 17 All
actors in the food supply chain-growers, processors, distributors, and
retailers-share an interest in safeguarding their market by devel-
oping practices that reduce the chances for contamination and limit its
effect. As the failure of any actor to maintain good practices can
thwart the efforts of all the others, adhesion to the regime will be a
precondition to contracting in the market-collective action will pre-
vent any actor from producing a negative externality that harms the
others. Government, as the protector of public health, has comple-
mentary interests. So, as in the case of contextualizing regimes
addressing judicial ignorance as in the cotton industry, collective
responses to high-uncertainty multilateral regimes that seek to miti-
gate risks rather than maximize gains can be formed either by public
or private action, depending on the configuration of collective action
problems.
The California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing
Agreement (LGMA) is an exemplar of an (initially) private regime of
this type.118 Leafy greens became a public concern after highly publi-
cized disease outbreaks from tainted spinach and lettuce in 2006."1
Leafy greens are often eaten raw (cooking kills most micro-
pathogens); they are often sold as mixed salads that mingle pieces
picked in different locations. These factors, in combination with the
increasing scale of production, greatly multiply the chances for cross
contamination. Federal food regulation traditionally had focused on
117 See Food-Trade Network Vulnerable to Fast Spread of Contaminants, SCIENCE
DAILY.COM (June 7, 2012), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/06/1206071 8024 1.
htm (discussing the international food-trade network's vulnerability to fast-spreading
contaminants).
118 State of Cal. Dep't of Food & Agric., California Leafy Green Products Handler
Marketing Agreement (effective as amended Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter California
Marketing Agreement], available at http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/mkt/pdf/CA%20Leafy%
20Green%2OProducts%2OHandler%20Agreement.pdf.
119 See generally Julie Schmit, All Bacteria May Not Come Out in the Wash, USA
TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, at 1B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/
2006-10-04-spinach-wash-usat-x.htm (discussing the 2006 outbreak and the special con-
cerns associated with eating raw spinach).
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post-farm industrial processing 20 and was ill-prepared to address the
numerous points on the farm by which pathogens could enter this
food chain.
In 2007, after the outbreaks of illness, the FDA embarked on a
program to encourage and assist state and private efforts at regime
building.121 Thereafter, the Western Growers Association of
California petitioned the state to recognize the LGMA. The growers
were acting under the authority of a state marketing act that confers
antitrust immunity for various purposes on organizations of agricul-
tural producers.122 There are currently about 120 members of the
trade association and collectively they account for roughly ninety-nine
percent of California leafy green production (which in turn accounts
for about seventy-five percent of national production).123
The LGMA designates safety standards or "best practices" for
the farms from which member handlers buy leafy greens.124 The stan-
dards require growers and processors to prepare plans for identifying
all hazardous control points, and to detail the steps they have taken to
mitigate the hazard. Members also commit to a monitoring and
reporting regime that seeks to verify the efficacy of any precautionary
actions that are undertaken.125 Inspectors from the California
Department of Food and Agriculture monitor compliance with the
120 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1), 601(m)(4) (2006) (prohibiting the sale of food that is
"injurious to health"); id. §§ 601(m)(3) (prohibiting the sale of food that is "unsound,
unhealthful, unwholesome, or otherwise unfit").
121 See Marian Burros, Government Offers Guidelines to Fresh-Food Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A17. The agency also pointed to insufficient enforcement
resources. Id.
122 Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1280.
123 See U.S.D.A. Agric. Mktg. Serv., Justification of Proposed Federal Marketing
Agreement for Leafy Green Vegetables, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDoc
Name=STELPRDC5077207. See generally Varun Shekhar, Produce Exceptionalism:
Examining the Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement and Its Ability to Improve Food Safety,
6 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 267 (2010) (evaluating the benefits and weaknesses of the LGMA in
ensuring food safety).
124 The LGMA is governed by a thirteen-member board. Board members are chosen by
the state Secretary of Agriculture from nominations by the membership. Between seven
and twelve members must be representatives of the handler-members of the organization;
the Department of Food and Agriculture may also appoint an additional member who is
supposed to represent "the general public." California Marketing Agreement, supra note
118, art. III; Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1280.
125 See California Marketing Agreement, supra note 118, art. V (discussing the require-
ment that members must follow the Agreement's Best Practices in order to use the official
Service Mark of the Agreement). See generally Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg.
Bd., Commodity Specific Food Safety Guidelines for the Production and Harvest of
Lettuce and Leafy Greens (Jul. 22, 2011), available at http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/
sites/default/files/LGMA%20Accepted%2OFood%20Safety%20Practices%207.22.11.pdf
(containing various provisions that impose record-keeping requirements on signatory
handlers).
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standards specified in the Agreement.126 Importantly, in order to
respond effectively to a later discovery of contamination, the LGMA
requires each handler to maintain records that permit inspectors to
identify the farm and field from which all components of its products
originate. 127 The regime relies critically on informal enforcement: The
members commit to deal only with farms that comply with the stan-
dards. As in the case of the low-uncertainty contextualizing regimes
such as the cotton industry trade associations, the ultimate sanction
for noncompliance with formal procedures is suspension or with-
drawal of a recalcitrant member's right to use a service mark. In this
way, temporary or permanent exclusion from the industry is enforced
informally. 28
As in our previous examples, the success of the LGMA and the
durability of the innovation in joint collaboration between private
actors and public entities to reduce food safety risks requires a reas-
sessment of the role of generalist courts and the extent to which they
can successfully apply traditional common law contract principles to
the unique problems that will arise with disputes under this regime. A
properly functioning contextualizing regime, we argue, assigns to
administrative institutions the responsibility for establishing the base-
line of standards of behavior and processes, and assigns to courts the
more limited role of identifying significant deviations from that base-
line in particular cases.129
126 Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1280.
127 Id. at 1281.
128 California Marketing Agreement, supra note 118. There is a parallel regime in
Arizona, and there are other private standard-setting and certification regimes, such as
GlobalGAP (for "good agricultural practices"), "an organization formed by major
European retailers," and a "private international organization, the Global Food Safety
Initiative, [that] assesses certification regimes in accordance with a set of metastandards."
Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1284. "Once a certification regime has itself been certified
at this level, buyers who have previously decided to accept any of the other approved
certifications should be willing to accept it." Id. For further discussion of the Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement), see JOANNE
Scorr, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASUREs 41-75
(2007) (discussing the SPS agreement as an attempt to mitigate an accountability gap in the
area of food safety regulation through, among other things, "the regulation of regulation").
129 The 2010 federal Food Safety Modernization Act reinforces the mechanisms
embodied in the LGMA. Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, §§ 102-105,
201-205, 301-307, 124 Stat. 3885-905, 3923-39, 3953-66 (2011) (amending the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to have more stringent, detailed, and preventive require-
ments). The Act mandates that each food processing facility develop, implement, monitor,
validate, and update a plan for hazard control. Id. § 103. The Act also directs the FDA to
set standards for fruits and vegetables, id. § 105(a), and "it seems clear that such standards
will be developed in a way that relies on organizations like the LGMA" to continue and
advance the joint exploration of risks and possible mitigations on which this type of regime
depends. Sabel & Simon, supra note 2, at 1284-85.
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CONCLUSION
MAPPING UNCERTAINTY AND SCALE ON
CONTEXTUALIZING REGIMES
Contractual innovation is the third step in a dynamic process.
Exogenous change in the business environment evokes substantive
innovation in business practices as private actors adjust existing struc-
tures or procedures to make them efficient under the changed circum-
stances. Innovations in contract form then arise to stabilize the new
arrangements. It is only at this point that generalist courts enter the
picture, when they are asked to resolve disputes and standardize the
workings of the contractual innovation. Their task is to adapt the
application of contract law to the context presented by the contractual
innovation.
As we have seen, contracting parties increasingly create contextu-
alizing regimes to delineate the context for understanding the rela-
tionship into which the parties have entered. These regimes can take
different forms depending centrally on the level of uncertainty in the
new circumstances and the scale associated with the activities affected.
In thin-market conditions, regimes range from bespoke contract
design to bilateral collaborative agreements that are interpreted by
generalist courts. In thick markets, collective actions can stimulate the
formation of trade associations as well as arbitration regimes, expert
courts, and public-private partnerships between trade associations and
government regulatory agencies. The Figure that follows summarizes
the relationship between levels of uncertainty and scale and how these
combinations map onto the characteristics of the matching contextual-
izing regime.
This mapping between uncertainty, scale, and the form of contex-
tualizing regime frames the problem confronting generalist courts in
assessing how they can facilitate contractual innovation. As in the case
of the effort to create a contextualizing regime for insurance law, a
court's ill-considered approach to an innovative contract can
undermine the innovation.130 While the role of generalist courts will
differ across the regions of the taxonomy of contractual innovation, in
all cases it will be more restricted than the standard account. By that
account, courts should strive in the course of adjudicating disputes to
incorporate incipient context into the formal structure of commercial
law.131 The error there is twofold. Initially, as we have argued, gener-
alist courts are peculiarly ill-equipped to discover and understand the
context that innovative parties have developed. Moreover, by the time
130 See supra note 50 (discussing challenges faced by reviewing courts).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 2-5 (discussing courts' consideration of context).
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FIGURE: CONTEXTUALIZING REGIMES AS A FUNCTION
OF SCALE AND UNCERTAINTY
Uncertainty Low ) Uncertainty High
Thick Market Cotton market Leafy greens; Food safety
(Common (Trade associations develop (Industry organization in
Transactions, context through form collaboration with
Many Participants) documents wtth common government agency)
sabstantive terms; private4, adjudication)
Thick Market Architects and contrctors Delaware Court of Chancery
(Common (Trade associations develop (Expert Courts; application
Transactions with context through form of standards)
Important documents with common
Idiosyncratic Aspects) process; private or public( i adjudication)
Thin Market State-contingent bilateral Contracting for innovation;
(Few Participants) contracts; generalist courts Preliminary agreements(Bilateral contract with
braiding of formal and
informal elements)
a dispute reaches the courts much of the contextualization will already
have been undertaken by other institutions, including, most impor-
tantly, by the parties themselves.
Thus, the task for generalist courts is to recognize that contextual-
izing regimes are the institutions through which they first encounter
contractual innovation, and that the higher the uncertainty associated
with the regime, the more restricted the courts' role. These regimes,
including the constraints parties impose on courts in bilateral con-
tracts like preliminary agreements, reflect the methods of mutual
cooperation the parties have chosen to provide the context that
should govern their relationship. If a central goal of contract adjudica-
tion is to enforce the context that the parties have provided, then
improvements in the relation between courts and contextualizing
regimes-that is, the courts' willingness to defer to the context the
parties give them-will put the law more directly in the service of
innovation. To do that, both judges and contract theorists will have to
attend to the unique characteristics of novel contract forms as they are
influenced by the key variables of uncertainty and scale. Thus, as we
suggested at the outset, courts must practice the passive virtues in
responding to contract innovation driven by changes in the con-
tracting parties' business environment: The parties, not the courts,
drive innovation.
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